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Managing information asymmetry in public-private relationships undergoing a 
digital transformation: The role of contractual and relational governance
Abstract
Purpose – Inter-organisational governance is an important enabler for information-processing, 
particularly in relationships undergoing digital transformation (DT) where partners depend on each 
other for information in decision-making. Based on information processing theory (IPT), we theoretically 
and empirically investigate how governance mechanisms address information asymmetry (uncertainty 
and equivocality) arising in capturing, sharing and interpreting information generated by digital 
technologies.
Design/methodology/approach – IPT is applied to four cases of public-private relationships in the Dutch 
infrastructure sector that aim to enhance the quantity and quality of information-based decision-making 
by implementing digital technologies. The investigated relationships are characterised by differing 
degrees and types of information uncertainty and equivocality. We build on rich datasets including 
archival data, observations, contract documents and interviews.
Findings – Addressing information uncertainty requires invoking contractual control and coordination. 
Contract clauses should be precise and incentive schemes functional in terms of information 
requirements. Information equivocality is best addressed using relational governance. Identifying 
information requirements and reducing information uncertainty is a prerequisite for the transformation 
activities that organisations perform to reduce information equivocality. 
Originality – This study draws on IPT to study public-private relationships undergoing DT. The study links 
contractual control and coordination as well as relational governance mechanisms to information-
processing activities that organisations deploy to reduce information uncertainty and equivocality. 

































































Practical implications – The study offers insights into the roles of both governance mechanisms in 
managing information asymmetry in public-private relationships. The study uncovers key activities for 
gathering, sharing and transforming of information when using digital technologies. 
Keywords: Digital transformation, information asymmetry, contractual governance, relational 
governance, public-private relationships, Information Processing Theory


































































The role of information technology in supporting information and process integration within and 
between organisations is well-established (Kache and Seuring, 2017; Venkatraman, 1991). More 
recently, the concept of digital transformation (DT), driven by new information and communication-
based technologies (e.g. data analytics, smart sensors), has attracted scholarly attention (Brinch, 2018; 
Lanzolla et al., 2018). As these digital technologies may greatly enhance the quantity and quality of data 
available for decision-making (Waller and Fawcett, 2013), DT is seen as an important enabler for smart 
maintenance of production assets (Bokrantz et al., 2020). 
This study draws on information processing theory (IPT; Galbraith, 1974), which posits that 
organisations deploy information-processing activities (Daft and Weick, 1984) that best address the 
amount and type of information asymmetry they are faced with (Bode et al., 2011). More specifically, 
we build on IPT and distinguish two types of information asymmetry – uncertainty (lack of information) 
and equivocality (ambiguity of information; Zhao et al., 2018). While gathering more data may help 
mitigate information uncertainty (Bode et al., 2011), addressing equivocality may require cognitive skills 
to transform data by ordering and presenting data in a logical way. Both information uncertainty and 
equivocality are likely to be present in public-private relationships undergoing DT, with the use of digital 
technologies increasing the amount and quality of available data, while also offering enhanced 
possibilities for analysis and transformation. Thus, digital technologies can affect information acquisition 
and transformation processes in these inter-organisational relationships (IORs). 
At the same time, collaborative activities of informatio -gathering and transformation may be 
difficult to organise in public-private relationships due to public and private organisations’ divergent 
goals and incentives as well as their differences in terms of institutional backgrounds, values, practices 
and decision-making processes (e.g. Caldwell et al., 2017; Roehrich et al., 2014). This raises concerns 
about how public organisations may govern information-processing activities with their private partners 
for the purpose of enhanced decision-making (e.g. timing of maintenance activities). Inter-organisational 
governance – the formal and informal rules of exchange between partners (Cao and Lumineau, 2015; 
Roehrich et al., 2020) – supported by contractual and relational governance mechanisms (Poppo and 
Zenger, 2002), may be instrumental in addressing possible information asymmetries resulting from 
separate yet interdependent data collection and analyses by public and private organisations. 
A consideration of the role that governance mechanisms play in leveraging the high volume of 
data generated by digital technologies addresses several knowledge gaps in the inter-organisational 
governance and DT literatures. First, although prior studies on DT have loosely mentioned the possibility 

































































of increasing data generation (and so potentially addressing information uncertainty; Sternberg et al., 
2020) and digital technology’s analytical capabilities (which may address information equivocality; Frank 
et al., 2019), no detailed and comprehensive study has investigated DT’s impact on information 
asymmetry and processing activities. Developing a more detailed understanding of information 
acquisition and transformation processes taking place in relation to information asymmetry is crucial in 
understanding DT and clarifies the relationships between contexts, outcomes and governance 
instruments (Formentini and Taticchi, 2016). Second, prior studies offer very limited insights into how 
contractual and relational governance mechanisms may support information acquisition and 
transformation processes (Kache and Seuring, 2017). Lumineau (2017), for example, argues theoretically 
that contracts influence information-processing by specifying rules, operating procedures and incentive 
schemes, but he does not study in detail how contracts affect information acquisition and 
transformation nor the role of relational governance mechanisms. Furthermore, the notion that control 
and coordination dimensions of formal contracts affect their information-processing capacity has so far 
received limited empirical validation. This is a vital area as the effective governance of inter-
organisational relationships is paramount to organisations’ survival, requiring governance mechanisms 
to mitigate information asymmetry.
We address these gaps by studying how organisations in public-private relationships – which 
increasingly use digital technologies to collect rich data (Baldus and Hatton, 2020) – may deploy 
contractual and relational governance to support information acquisition and transformation in the 
context of DT, thereby reducing information uncertainty and equivocality. Public-private relationships 
represent a suitable research setting as both partners grapple with different information processing 
needs. For example, public organisations often have strict responsibilities imposed by the national 
government, meaning that if an infrastructure asset fails, the public organisation is held accountable 
even when the cause is poor maintenance by a private supplier. As a result, public organisations require 
more information than a private supplier would usually document. Differences may also emerge with 
regard to the interpretation of information. While a public organisation often prefers timely 
replacement of components to avoid breakdowns, private suppliers may use data to perform a risk-
analysis and consequently decide to stretch the lifetime of that component. 
Building on IPT, we investigate four cases to address the following research question: How do 
contractual and relational governance mechanisms address information asymmetry in public-private 
relationships undergoing digital transformation? The investigated cases concern two Dutch public 
organisations outsourcing the maintenance of their transportation networks and their relationships with 

































































private suppliers. All four public-private relationships are undergoing DT because of increased use of 
digital technologies (i.e. the implementation of smart sensors to collect data about the health of the 
infrastructure networks). The paper draws on a rich dataset including archival data, observations, 
contracts and interviews. 
We contribute to extant research in two main ways. First, we advance DT research by showing 
how DT affects information uncertainty and equivocality as well as information-gathering and 
transformation activities in public-private relationships as a specific type of IORs. We illustrate that 
digital technologies address information uncertainty by generating more data and equivocality through 
enhanced transformation activities. Our findings also show that organisations need to develop their 
data-gathering and transformation capabilities, as increased data availability does not imply that these 
data can readily be accessed or that they make a meaningful contribution to decision-making. Second, 
our study theoretically and empirically investigates the roles of contractual and relational governance 
mechanisms in IORs undergoing DT, thus extending prior governance literature. Both governance 
mechanisms are important, but they each have different roles in supporting information-processing. Our 
findings show that contractual control and coordination are more effective in supporting data-gathering 
activities, while relational governance underpins information transformation. The use of contractual 
control clarifies partners’ obligations in gathering and sharing data and needs to be complemented by 
coordination clauses that guide data-gathering activities, with clauses that help accessing the right data 
type and quality and appropriate incentive schemes. Relational governance supports data 
transformation as it facilitates openness about what data is gathered and what meaningful information 
that data could be turned into. The development of relational norms enhances partners’ understanding 
on what data is required for what purposes and fosters pro-active information sharing. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. First, we review relevant literature on DT, IPT 
and inter-organisational governance. Subsequently, we elaborate our research approach after which we 
present our findings. We then discuss theoretical contributions and practical implications, and highlight 
limitations and future research opportunities, before concluding the paper. 
2. Theoretical Background 
2.1 Digital transformation of maintenance service delivery 
DT involves the implementation of data-driven and software-managed processes, which in turn 
generate large volumes of data that can be used to increase information availability, transparency and 
visibility in IORs (Sternberg et al., 2020). Following prior studies, our paper treats data as the raw 

































































material of information, thus data are unprocessed and an asset awaiting transformation into 
information (Sivarajah et al., 2017). Data gathered using digital technologies are seen as ‘the new oil’ 
(Hartmann et al., 2016), highlighting the importance of exploiting and refining data to attain high 
performance levels for a focal organisation and their supply chain. Various digital base technologies (i.e. 
the Internet of Things (IoT), cloud services, big data) enable a wide range of front-end technologies (i.e. 
smart-manufacturing, -products, -supply chains, and -working) concerned with operational and market 
needs along four dimensions (Frank et al., 2019). Smart maintenance (Bokrantz et al., 2020; Huang et al., 
2020) comprises elements of both smart manufacturing (e.g. smart sensor data, enabling predictive 
maintenance) and smart working (e.g. virtual reality, enabling interactive and real-time guidance of 
maintenance tasks; Scurati et al., 2018). Data-driven decision-making (e.g. prediction and prescription of 
maintenance actions) and external integration (e.g. sharing and consolidating heterogeneous data 
sources with external parties) are being noted as key dimensions (Bokrantz et al., 2020). Suppliers are an 
important source of valuable data, as the digital technologies embedded in their offerings may predict 
failures and prescribe actions to be taken. As such, the ubiquity of data, computing power and analytical 
capabilities may help drive performance of maintenance service providers (Olsen and Tomlin, 2020). As 
suppliers are progressively assuming responsibilities regarding product and process innovation (Blome 
et al., 2013), information sharing and collaboration with suppliers (Huang et al., 2020) provide ample 
opportunities for organisations to improve their productivity and to transform processes. 
While prior studies offer some insights with regard to how data are being gathered, much less is 
known about how data are analysed and interpreted (Yu et al., 2019), especially in situations where 
possibilities and responsibilities for data collection and analysis are distributed across dyadic 
relationships including public-private ones. A more detailed understanding of how organisations 
organise these activities to manage information needed for decision-making is crucial for DT.
2.2 Information processing needs for digital transformation in public-private relationships
Drawing on IPT, we argue that in the face of environmental uncertainty  i.e. “the difference in the 
amount of information required to perform the task and the information already possessed by the 
organisation” (Galbraith, 1973, p. 5)  organisations deploy information-processing activities (i.e. 
gathering, processing and communicating information; Daft and Weick, 1984) that best address 
information asymmetry (Bode et al., 2011; Galbraith, 1974). Information asymmetry is referred to as 
either the absence of information (uncertainty) or the messiness/ambiguity of information (equivocality) 
(Zhao et al., 2018). Whereas gathering more data may help mitigate information uncertainty (Bode et 

































































al., 2011), equivocality requires cognitive skills to transform data including ordering and presenting 
information in a logical way. This is particularly pertinent when the information required is ill-structured, 
difficult to evaluate and requires more than one individual for interpretation (Daft and Lengel, 1986). 
Prior work has addressed organisations’ approaches to reducing information-processing 
requirements (Galbraith, 1973). Here, IPT helps to explain organisational behaviour “in terms of 
information that must be gathered, interpreted, synthesised, and coordinated in the context of decision-
making” (Burns and Wholey, 1993, p. 110). IPT has, for example, been used to assess the impact of 
internal manufacturing complexity on the organisations’ triple bottom line (Wiengarten et al., 2017) and 
to study the mechanisms managers can use to create internal strategic consensus (Rosado Feger, 2014). 
Recent work has extended IPT to an inter-organisational level, addressing how organisations develop 
information-processing capabilities to deal with supply chain disruptions (Bode et al., 2011), 
sustainability-related uncertainty (Dahlmann and Roehrich, 2019) and cost management challenges in 
new product development (Ellram et al., 2020). However, relatively little attention is paid to inter-
organisational relationships’ capacity to gather and process information (Yu et al., 2019), despite the 
increasing importance of joint efforts between focal organisations and their suppliers to systematically 
gather and analyse information, especially in light of the possibilities and challenges that DT brings. 
Furthermore, the majority of prior (IPT informed) operations and supply chain management 
(OSCM) studies focus on relationships involving private organisations, despite the fact that information-
processing is considered essential to “bridge disagreement and diversity” (Daft and Lengel, 1986, p. 556) 
between two organisations that may have different objectives and values as is often observed in public-
private relationships (Caldwell et al., 2009). These public-private relationships are defined as “any long-
term collaborative relationships between one or more private actors and public bodies that combine 
public sector management or oversight with a private partner’s resources and competencies for direct 
provision of a public good or service” (Kivleniece and Quelin, 2012, p. 273). Public-private collaborations 
are now a global phenomenon, with the UK leading the deployment of such relationships with 
approximately 360 public-private partnerships (PPPs; a form of public-private relationships) for a total 
value of €58bn that have been initiated in the past 10 years (EPEC, 2017). During the same period in the 
Netherlands, 34 PPPs were initiated that account for a total value of €10bn (EPEC, 2017). 
Although prior OSCM studies have highlighted the characteristics of public-private interactions 
(e.g. Roehrich and Lewis, 2014; Zheng et al., 2008), recent publications call for further empirical research 
of relationships between public and private organisations (e.g. Mishra and Browning, 2020). While the 
aim of the private actor is often to appropriate created economic value via private rents, the aim of 

































































public organizations is to maximize predominantly appropriable (social) value for various beneficiaries 
(Klein et al., 2010). Combining the efforts of private, value maximising firms and more social interest 
driven public organisations (Hart, 2003), public-private collaborations intersect the operating logic of 
both political and economic markets, and may feature a more heterogeneous, interdependent set of 
interests when compared to private-private relationships (Kivleniece and Quelin, 2012; Mahoney et al., 
2009). These relationships may therefore carry potentially vital gains in terms of efficiency, innovation 
and ability to draw upon unique resources and capabilities residing in the private sector (Cabral, 2017), 
and outperform either (public and private) sector working alone (Lepak et al., 2007; Roehrich and 
Kivleniece, 2021). 
By the nature of their cross-sector design, however, these collaborations are also exposed to 
divergent incentives and objectives as well as resource and capability gaps underlying each sector 
(Hartmann et al., 2014; Quelin et al., 2019). For instance, these relationships may face substantial 
governance costs tied to the complex nature of underlying contracts, and the additional monitoring, 
control and enforcement needs – not least due to potentially divergent knowledge basis, goals, values, 
incentives and behaviours, organisational routines, and capabilities (Caldwell et al., 2017; Quelin et al., 
2017; Rangan et al., 2006). It is vital to avoid coordination failures in these relationships which may stem 
from, for instance, cognitive limitations (bounded rationality) of those who design and implement 
coordination mechanisms (e.g. failure to recognise interdependencies, attention constraints which may 
limit monitoring effectiveness) and from underlying cultural differences (as presented by private and 
public organisation’s goals and values) (Gulati et al., 2012; Kalra et al., 2021). Thus, adopting optimal 
governance mechanisms is crucial in such relationships to align incentives, allocate decision rights and 
ensure information flows for maximising underlying partners’ commitment (Cabral et al., 2019; Klein et 
al., 2019),  and may address a central tension in terms of how to coordinate across public and private 
organisations. Hence, public-private relationships offer a fruitful context for studying how the effective 
deployment of governance mechanisms can support data-gathering and transformation activities and 
help manage information asymmetry in the context of DT.
2.3 Inter-organisational governance
IORs are highly dependent on effective coordination and control using reliable information to meet 
performance targets including, for instance, high quality maintenance services. This is particularly 
important in the context of DT, as the adoption of digital technologies provides opportunities for 
increasing data quantity and quality, while also presenting challenges in terms of how to gather and 

































































process data. High interdependence between partnering organisations “increases the need for a 
common formalised language in order to enable the exchange of information” (Gattiker and Goodhue, 
2004, p. 433). Inter-organisational governance mechanisms, i.e. the formal and informal rules of 
exchange between partners (Cao and Lumineau, 2015; Olsen et al., 2005; Roehrich et al., 2020), may 
provide such a ‘common language’. In line with IPT, we argue that contractual and relational governance 
mechanisms may act as frames and filters that influence how organisations collect data generated by 
using digital technologies, and transform data into information that can be used and shared for decision-
making in the IOR (Lumineau, 2017; Thompson, 1967).
Contractual governance in the form of written, legally enforceable contracts helps to define roles 
and responsibilities between exchange partners and support the framing of predetermined promises 
and obligations for resolving potential disputes and conflicts (Luo, 2002). OSCM research, in particular, 
has stressed the multiple roles of contracts in managing buyer-supplier relationships, including those in 
public-private exchange settings (e.g. Kapsali et al., 2019; Roehrich et al., 2021; Zheng et al., 2008). 
Contracts include a wide range of provisions (depending on contract type such as performance-based 
contracts; Essig et al., 2016) that can potentially be used to control a counterpart’s behaviour and 
safeguard against possible opportunism (Steinbach et al., 2018), coordinate inter-organisational 
processes, adapt exchanges in the face of environmental uncertainty, and even codify lessons learned 
regarding efficient inter-firm collaboration and contracting (Howard et al., 2019; Selviaridis, 2016). 
Contracts can also be used as framing devices aimed at eliciting productive responses by counterparts 
(Selviaridis and Van der Valk, 2019; Weber and Mayer, 2011). 
Contracts influence information-processing by specifying explicit rules and operating procedures, 
planning and incentive systems (Halldórsson and Skjøtt-Larsen, 2006; Hartmann et al., 2014; Lumineau, 
2017), which may stimulate suppliers to improve their processing capabilities (Glock et al., 2017). 
Control and coordination clauses can both facilitate information-gathering by explicitly stipulating 
information exchange (including type, frequency, quality) between contracting parties (Faems et al., 
2008; Jayaraman et al., 2013; Mayer and Argyres, 2004). Coordination clauses can influence the way 
information is interpreted (Daft and Weick, 1984; Fiol, 1994) by facilitating communication and 
supporting information transfer (Mesquita and Brush, 2008; Zheng et al., 2008) as well as by joint 
transformation between partners (Puranam et al., 2006). For example, the study by Zheng et al. (2008) 
showed that contracts can function as a knowledge repository where information is being stored and 
accessible for contracting partners in addressing information asymmetry. Prior studies (Schepker et al., 

































































2014; Tushman and Nadler, 1978) argued that the more comprehensive contractual control and 
coordination mechanisms are, the greater the ability to process information and deal with uncertainty. 
Compared to contracts, relational governance mechanisms depend on trust and social norms 
among partners, fostering a joint approach to addressing information asymmetry (Poppo et al., 2008) in 
buyer-supplier relationships (e.g. Chakkol et al., 2018; Roehrich and Lewis, 2014). Trust has been 
positioned as minimising the probability of opportunism and conflict as well as increasing collaboration 
and information exchange (Carey et al., 2011; Inkpen and Tsang, 2005). Relational norms, referring to 
the shared behavioural expectations of partners involved in a relationship (Cannon et al., 2000; Heide 
and John, 1992), imply a bilateral expectation that parties will proactively provide useful information to 
their partner in support of the ongoing relationship. Trust and relational norms based on flexibility, 
openness and information sharing are instrumental in governing IORs where information processing 
across organisational boundaries is of essence such as in complex projects (Chakkol et al., 2018) and 
public-private relationships (Roehrich and Lewis, 2014). Relational governance may influence the 
processing of information through social processes (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). In the presence of trust, 
parties are more likely to expend effort into gathering and joint transformation of information. Trust is 
vital for effective information sharing, operational linkages and cooperative norms among partners 
(Ghosh and Fedorowicz, 2008). Increasing levels of relational governance and trust between partnering 
organisations helps to jointly transform information to address asymmetry in a dyad when offering more 
complex services (Kreye et al., 2015). The flow of information in relationships characterised by high 
levels of trust allows for enhanced synthesis of information; partners actively provide useful 
information, thereby frequently soliciting and exchanging private information (Carson and John, 2013; 
Heide and John, 1992). 
Overall, in the context of DT, where the provision of maintenance services is increasingly enabled 
by digital technologies, generating and sharing information in IORs relies on effective coordination and 
control through governance mechanisms. At the same time, our understanding of the roles of both 
contractual and relational governance mechanisms in gathering and interpreting information remains 
limited. 
3. Methods
3.1 Research setting, design and case selection
We employed a multiple-case design (Yin, 2009) to investigate the role of governance mechanisms in 
addressing information asymmetry in four public-private relationships, embedded in two public 

































































organisations undergoing DT (Table 1). Our design thus yielded multiple observations of contractual and 
relational governance challenges faced by the two public buying organisations we studied (Golden-
Biddle and Locke, 2007). Our research setting was the Dutch infrastructure sector where public 
organisations were tasked with managing critical infrastructure networks and have started to adopt 
digital technologies (Baldus and Hatton, 2020) to enhance infrastructure network management and to 
stimulate smart maintenance (Bokrantz et al., 2020). At the same time, both public organisations 
depended on the specialist resources and competencies of their private suppliers for leveraging data 
produced by these technologies to realise smart maintenance and sharing valuable information related 
to the networks’ condition (RAE, 2012). The infrastructure networks to be maintained were thus fully 
owned and operated by the public organisations and maintained by private suppliers. The first case 
organisation (Road) was responsible for all motorways (including bridges and tunnels) and waterways 
(including sluices and water pumps) in the Netherlands. The second case organisation (Rail) was 
responsible for the entire railway network in the Netherlands. 
The four cases were selected after conducting exploratory research including pilot interviews and 
the collection and analysis of secondary data (Table 2). The investigated cases had a number of unique 
qualities that made them logical candidates for sampling (Shah and Corley, 2006) and we employed a 
theoretical sampling logic (Patton, 1990) based on the following key criteria. First, each of the four 
investigated public-private relationships involved the recent adoption of digital technologies (i.e. 
mounting smart sensors to critical assets to gather more and better data) that may enable improving 
infrastructure management and maintenance. Second, we purposefully sampled relationships in which 
the public organisations rely on their private suppliers for real-time data about the assets (resulting in 
information uncertainty as private suppliers may not be sufficiently incentivised to provide public 
organisations with complete data) and in which historical data in databases of the case organisations are 
incomplete, of insufficient quality and/or messy. As a result, our cases were characterised by different 
degrees and types of information asymmetry, i.e. uncertainty and/or equivocality. Lastly, all four 
relationships involved public tenders and supplier selection based on best value evaluations and were 
governed by a contract with durations of at least five years and concerning substantial revenues for the 
private suppliers involved. This speaks to the notion of a detailed contract and the importance of 
contractual governance in these investigated relationships. Following Schilke and Lumineau (2018, p. 
2849) who argued that “it seems likely that the contracting process may play a less central role in 
simpler, shorter, or more exploitation-oriented types of alliances”, we purposely selected cases that 
involved longer, more collaborative types of relationships to ensure relational governance mechanisms 

































































were present and used. We had a rare opportunity to have extensive access to employees and (archival 
and contractual) documents at both case organisations, which enabled us to explore governance 
mechanisms fully.
< Please insert Tables 1 & 2 here. >
3.2 Data collection and sources
Our study combined primary (observations, interviews), contracts and secondary data sources (vision 
and strategy documents, presentation slides, and government and industry reports). We collected data 
using a two-stage strategy. During the exploratory research stage (March – September 2018), eight pilot 
interviews and selected site visits at both case organisations were conducted and archival data were 
collected. Analysing these data sources helped to establish an interview protocol and to select 
appropriate cases. The subsequent in-depth case research stage (November 2018 – December 2019) 
involved the lead author conducting 20 interviews to collect data on each of the four investigated cases 
in real-time (during the ongoing public-private relationship undergoing DT). Also, contracts and various 
other archival data were collected (Table 2) to achieve data triangulation (Jick, 1979). Data gathering 
from multiple sources continued until theoretical saturation was achieved and was key to understanding 
and unpacking relational and contractual governance and their role in addressing information 
asymmetry in detail. For example, access to contracts proved instrumental in complementing our 
interview data with respect to how contracts enabled data collection activities by the case organisations, 
thereby helping to reduce information uncertainty. The following sections explain in detail the data 
sources we collected and how they aided our study.
Archival data and observations during site visits and meetings. We collected and analysed 25 
documents as well as observational data produced during site visits and meetings (approximately 55h). 
Overall, the archival data and observations provided a deeper understanding of the case organisations, 
the sector, key suppliers, the maintenance data that were collected, and the mix of contractual and 
relational governance mechanisms employed by case organisations in relation to the implementation of 
digital technologies.
Contracts. We analysed 31 contract documents, including core agreements (e.g. specifying 
supplier responsibilities and scope), specifications of minimum requirements (e.g. asset availability), and 
general guidelines regarding what data needed to be shared and when (e.g. registering the nature of a 
failure, actions taken and components that were replaced). Various annexes captured region-specific 
details (e.g. permits or exemptions). This was vital to unpack how the contract (and specific control and 
coordination clauses) were used to support information-processing activities. 

































































Interviews. We conducted eight pilot interviews (over nine hours) with several advisors from 
both organisations that had a thorough understanding of contract management processes and/or digital 
technologies. We then prepared summaries of the most important points that provided us with an initial 
understanding of the two case organisations and their operations and helped us to uncover potential 
cases. During the in-depth case research stage, 20 interviews (over 18 hours) were conducted with 
knowledgeable people (Alvesson, 2003) with different lengths of tenure in disparate hierarchical and 
functional roles. An interview protocol was designed (Appendix A) which we refined as the research 
progressed and new insights emerged. Semi-structured interviews included questions to help us 
understand the case organisations, the infrastructural assets involved and their maintenance 
requirements, past and current relationships with the private maintenance suppliers in focus, 
information-processing activities and the role of digital technologies in these processes. 
We applied specific criteria and measures to ensure validity and reliability of our case study 
findings in line with literature recommendations (e.g. Gibbert et al., 2008; McCutcheon and Meredith, 
1993; Yin, 2009). More specifically, we derived a research framework from extant literature and offered 
clarity about how data were collected and analysed (informant and data source triangulation). In order 
to increase generalisability, we built on analytical generalisation by seeking to identify patterns across 
cases (Ellram, 1996). The lead author coded each data source individually before discussing with the 
other three authors. This ensured not only a high degree of inter-coder reliability but also an in-depth 
understanding of the dataset across the author team. All interviews were recorded and transcribed, and 
subsequently reviewed by the respective informants to check for consistency. Finally, we maintained a 
database with all data sources used in the analysis to increase transparency and reliability. A detailed 
overview is presented in Appendix B.
3.3 Data analysis
As recommended by Barratt et al. (2011) and Miles and Huberman (1994), data coding and analysis 
activities took place in parallel with data collection. Notes from the pilot interviews and observations, as 
well as archival data collected during the exploratory research stage were assessed and discussed by the 
lead researcher and the second author to uncover interesting topics in the areas of digital technologies, 
contract management and maintenance at the case organisations. This helped in selecting the four cases 
and setting up the subsequent in-depth case research stage. Interview transcripts, contracts and archival 
data sources collected during the in-depth case research stage were subsequently coded using the data 
analysis software Atlas.ti. 

































































Before we started the coding process, we identified several provisional themes (i.e. ‘data 
acquisition’, ‘data transformation’, ‘contractual governance’, and ‘relational governance’) from our 
literature review to guide our coding.  As such, we ensured a clear link to prior literature, while 
providing flexibility to incorporate emerging themes such as ‘data needs’, ‘registration of data’, ‘bonus’, 
‘penalty’, and ‘supplier behaviour’ (i.e. open coding; Miles and Huberman, 1994). To assure the quality 
of the coding process, the lead researcher and the second author jointly discussed the initial open codes 
and established the initial coding structure, after which the lead researcher continued coding all 
transcripts and other documents. To enhance quality further, two research assistants each coded three 
transcripts from one of the cases, while the lead researcher coded all six interviews across both cases. 
Results between coders were compared to reduce potential biases or blindness to emerging constructs, 
with differences being resolved by trying to reconcile differing interpretations. For example, the codes 
‘supplier attitude’ and ‘supplier behaviour’ were reconciled under the label ‘supplier behaviour’. The 
results of this step were subsequently verified with the second author. Codes that could not be 
reconciled were critically evaluated by the lead researcher and the second author for their relevance 
(e.g. the code ‘replaceability of assets’ was considered less relevant as it did not relate to information-
processing or governance; the code ‘maturity of system’, which refers to asset management systems, 
was deemed relevant because it relates to information-processing). In the end, 49 unique codes were 
identified.
Subsequently, the open codes were grouped into higher-order categories (e.g. ‘contract design’ 
and ‘incentive schemes’) using axial coding procedures. This resulted in 10 second-order codes capturing 
one or several first-order codes. Finally, the second-order codes were related to the four main concepts 
under study: ‘data gathering & sharing’, ‘data transformation’, ‘contractual governance’ and ‘relational 
governance’. The resulting final coding structure (Appendix C) was used to analyse the remaining 
interviews, observations, contract documents and the archival data. 
4. Within-case analysis: Information processing in public-private relationships
This section presents the within-case analyses. The analyses outline first how DT affected the 
relationships in focus and then presents data on how the organisations managed their information-
processing activities using both governance mechanisms. 

































































4.1 Digital transformation in the public-private relationships at Road
The two public-private relationships at Road included pilot projects as part of an organisation-wide 
digitalisation programme called ‘Vital Assets’. In the past, Road’s maintenance decision-making relied on 
an OEM’s average lifecycle estimations and visual inspections (by Road or their private supplier). 
Usually, this resulted in maintenance taking place either too early or too late (e.g. a sluice door used to 
be maintained according to a pre-defined schedule or upon failure). As a result, Road’s assets were 
either unnecessarily unavailable (because assets were being maintained while still working properly) or 
unexpectedly failing and causing potentially dangerous situations. Introducing sensors and advanced 
data analytics allowed combining sensor-generated data with data from Road’s SCADA (a computerised 
control system used to operate assets) and asset management systems for better condition monitoring. 
Presenting the resulting information in a dashboard subsequently helped asset managers to handle 
assets more efficiently and suppliers to make more informed maintenance decisions that improved 
asset availability and user safety. For example, combining SCADA data on the sluice door movements 
with electricity usage of the door’s hydraulic system provided valuable insights: “You can see the failure 
and you also know what the failure is” (Asset Specialist, Road B). 
Having up-to-date information about their assets was essential as interviewees indicated that 
Road, being an executive agency of the Dutch government, had certain ‘extended responsibilities’, 
meaning that they would always remain responsible for the availability and safety of their infrastructural 
network. Even with private suppliers maintaining the network’s assets, Road should always keep itself 
informed about the state of the assets (e.g. to determine whether these are still safe enough to be used 
by the public). Road could not just point at the supplier in case a failure occurred: “If a supplier does 
something wrong, you can hold it against them. However, if the failure significantly hampers operations, 
then Road is ultimately responsible” (Advisor 1, Road A). Additionally, Road was obliged to work as 
transparently as possible as they were accountable to the government and to the public for the actions 
taken. As such, they required not only basic data about performed maintenance activities, but also 
detailed data that could help prove that assets were safe enough to be used. The ‘Vital Assets’ 
programme created awareness that Road needed to keep up with the technological developments that 
were changing the way maintenance was being performed. Moreover, instead of trying to ‘reinvent the 
wheel’, they acknowledged that capabilities and knowledge resided with their supplier. As such, they 
opted for developing collaborative relationships with their suppliers and changed the contracts 
accordingly: “In our contracts we want to organise a different way of collaboration in the area of smart 

































































maintenance, including a different way of rewarding [suppliers] to avoid unnecessary costs and to 
sharing knowledge and data” (Towards a vital infra sector, p. 40).
With the ‘Vital Assets’ programme Road developed an organisation-wide vision (captured in the 
‘Vision on Vital Assets’ document) with respect to how they should address the ongoing digital 
transformation that, among other things, enabled smart maintenance and management. Road viewed 
digital transformation to be an important element of their competitive environment, and considered 
themselves to be at a crossroad: “It is expected that the sector will develop itself further, with or without 
Road. Even if Road does nothing, assets will become increasingly smarter. A lot is already happening in 
this area without us being aware of it” (Vision on Vital Assets, p. 3). Furthermore, Road acknowledged 
that they lacked the capabilities to implement digital technologies successfully, as for years they had 
increasingly been passing on responsibilities to their suppliers. Under this ‘market unless’ principle as 
they called it, Road limited themselves to coordinating maintenance processes and refrained from 
requiring detailed information about their assets and maintenance performed. Suppliers, as a result, 
became fully responsible for assessing the actual states of assets and planning maintenance activities 
accordingly, and Road lost a significant part of their technical knowledge: “When we adopted the 
‘market unless’ principle, it [technological knowledge] significantly disappeared at several places 
[regional asset management departments]” (Contract Manager, Road A). As suppliers became more 
knowledgeable about Road’s assets, Road had become increasingly dependent on them for asset-
related information as well as interpretation of that information, i.e. “a possible dependence on the 
supplier who supplies data” and “a possible dependence on the supplier that performs data analyses” 
(Vision on Vital Assets in relation to procurement, p. 3). To reduce these dependencies and return to 
being a knowledgeable partner, Road decided to become more actively involved with their suppliers and 
with maintenance activities: “Now we see possibilities to build it [being a knowledgeable partner] up 
again. It is no surprise that programmes such as ‘Vital Assets’ triggered that old need” (Contract 
Manager, Road A). As a result, collaboration with private suppliers became a strong pillar in the Vital 
Assets programme and the pilots. 
Road A concerned a sluice that was a vital node in an important waterway corridor connecting the 
Netherlands with Germany, and a large water pump that regulated the water levels for several eastern 
provinces in the Netherlands. Road A invested some of the maintenance budget in sensors to measure 
sluice door corrosion rates and the stretching of the chains moving the doors (Project plan: Vital Assets – 
Pilot Road A, p. 9). The sensor data allowed the supplier to verify their degradation models and could 
also be combined with SCADA data to improve asset maintenance. Road B concerned with a sluice in a 

































































waterway corridor that acted as a gateway between the North Sea and the Dutch/European hinterland, 
and a large water pump that regulated water levels. Road B invested in sensors that monitored the 
health of the hydraulic system that moved the sluice doors (Project plan: Vital Assets – Pilot Road B, p. 
9). The private maintenance supplier did not contribute to this investment but was closely involved in 
decision-making as they were mounting the sensors to the assets and were, next to the regional asset 
management team, a main user of the data. 
Although both cases belonged to the same pilot project, closer inspection revealed regional 
differences in the levels of information asymmetry experienced. For example, while Road B found 
themselves confronted with issues with automated data transfer, Road A had no such problems. As a 
result, Road A was more able to access data and had relatively less information uncertainty than Road B. 
On the other hand, Road A had more difficulties with determining their information needs than Road B, 
leaving Road B with relatively less information equivocality. A selection of key evidence across both 
cases is shown in Tables 3a and 3b, which is referred to throughout the text using numbering (e.g. [3]).
< Please insert Tables 3a and 3b here. >
4.1.1 Road A
Information processing activities – Data gathering at Road A entailed manually registering results of 
planned inspections or causes of unexpected failures in Road’s asset management system [1]. 
Additionally, it included coordinating the process of setting up a direct connection with the supplier’s 
asset management system to enable seamless data sharing as indicated by the interviewees [2]. 
However, interviewees also suggested, “no explicit agreements were made” about the data that 
suppliers should gather and subsequently supply to Road A, as Road A’s team did not exactly know what 
they needed [3]. Road A therefore experienced incomplete datasets and hence rather extensive 
information uncertainty. Transforming data into information, on the other hand, was found to be 
complex and interviews with several team members showed that the team struggled in determining 
their information requirements [4,5]. For example, the team did not know which behaviours of their 
assets were abnormal and indicated pending failures, nor what information they needed about these 
behaviours to predict future maintenance needs. Support from and close cooperation with the private 
supplier was needed to ensure collected data were complete. The close relationship also included 
performing joint interpretation and transformation activities. For example, in order to develop key 
indicators for the performance dashboards, Asset Manager 2 set out to interpret the information shown 
by the dashboard jointly with his counterparts at the supplier: “You will always need each other with 

































































respect to this” [6]. As a result, information was less messy and information equivocality was relatively 
limited.
Contractual and relational governance in relation to information processing – An annex of the 
contract specified that “the supplier must deliver area data once maintenance is completed” (i.e. 
control) and share it with Road’s regional asset management team “so that Road can properly manage 
[the assets in] its area” [7,8] (i.e. coordination). As the contract excerpts show, data-sharing clauses 
were not very precise as they referred to broader tasks (e.g. while the task ‘addressing failures’ involved 
sharing data about the cause of failure and maintenance activities performed, what data was needed 
was not explicitly mentioned). Moreover, the contract failed to underline the importance of additional 
data that Road A needed to report on the degree to which they fulfil their public tasks (i.e. availability 
and safety of assets). The interviews confirmed the lack of explicit contractual agreements on data-
sharing [3] and explained that this made it difficult for Road to obtain the data they actually needed. The 
lack of understanding regarding what data was needed and why provided insufficient guidance and 
incentives for the suppliers to put in the efforts that Road A expected from them [10]. With respect to 
transformation, interviewees referred to a ‘progress report’, mentioned in the contract, implying a 
requirement for the supplier to transform data [14]. This progress report typically contained information 
on the assets’ health and on maintenance activities performed. No further evidence was found 
regarding contractually required information transformation activities. A plausible explanation was 
provided by the interviewees who indicated that it was difficult for the team to identify what 
information they needed and what the supplier should contribute [4,5]. This then inhibited developing 
specific contractual agreements. In parallel, an internal report described the need to redesign the 
current contract and incentive scheme to support knowledge sharing between Road A and their private 
suppliers [15].
Interviews with Road A’s regional asset management team and internal documents indicated that 
building a trusting relationship was expected to foster shared behavioural expectations and motivate 
the supplier to gather and share data they seemed hesitant to share, despite the contractual incentives 
in place [11,12,13]. For example, while the supplier aimed to maximise its value from the contract by 
performing a lot of maintenance activities, Road A aimed for the supplier to go beyond mere profits and 
become interested in the condition of the assets and start to understand the importance of sharing 
data: “You want them [private supplier] to be pro-active and act as if they actually owned the assets in 
our area. That they inform us about what is happening and what should be done” (Asset Manager 1). To 
facilitate information transformation activities, establishing a common goal furthermore fostered the 

































































development of shared behavioural expectations [16]. For example, interviewees described that instead 
of passively supplying data to suppliers so that they can verify their asset degradation models, the team 
aimed to analyse at least part of the data collaboratively, thus seeking to enhance both parties’ 
understanding of maintenance needs [17]. Asset Manager 1 pointed out that this is vital “to avoid 
discussion about the used data”. Stated differently, collaboratively interpreting the information derived 
from analytical models helped to reduce individual biases and to avoid the situation where Road A 
would become dependent on the private supplier to interpret information: “You have to look out for the 
situation where the supplier gets the raw data and modifies it. The next could be: ‘Look Road, this is 
interesting for you’ and that they try to sell that information back to us” (Advisor 1). Establishing a 
common goal (i.e. more efficiently organised maintenance) motivated both parties to invest in the 
collaborative information transformation activities required to achieve this goal, and helped the private 
suppliers to maintain assets in a timely and resource efficient way while helping Road A to increase asset 
availability. 
In sum, these findings suggest that Road A experienced extensive information uncertainty due to 
difficulties in determining their exact data needs and incomplete datasets regarding their assets. A 
combination of imprecise contractual control and coordination clauses described mainly how suppliers 
were supposed to share data, as opposed to which data needed to be shared. As such, for the private 
supplier it was not clear about what data needed to be shared. Road A tried to support their contractual 
agreements by building a collaborative relationship and establishing bilateral expectations as to 
motivate the supplier to go beyond the ‘letter of the contract’, and focus on the ‘bigger societal gains’ 
rather than merely their own goals. This included the supplier assisting Road A with their public task to 
offer reliable and safe infrastructures with a high level of availability. However, these relational 
governance mechanisms were not fully effective in complementing incomplete contract terms, resulting 
in only limited increases in suppliers’ understanding of what data to gather and share, and in Road A still 
missing some of the data they require.
Road A experienced limited information equivocality as they worked closely together with the 
private supplier to perform transformation activities effectively. As the contract only specified the 
requirement of progress reports to be prepared by the private supplier, joint transformation activities 
strongly relied on relational governance mechanisms, i.e., creating a trusting and collaborative 
relationship and establishing common goals. 


































































Information processing activities – Data gathering at Road B entailed data on results of planned 
inspections and causes of unexpected failures. However, in contrast to Road A, Road B’s supplier only 
needed to register these data in their own asset management system due to the direct link between 
their and Road B’s supplier’s asset management systems. Despite this direct link, certain fields in Road’s 
databases were nevertheless left empty because the technical configuration did not allow seamless data 
transfer [18]. As a result, Road B experienced extensive information uncertainty (when compared to 
Road A). Moreover, information uncertainty resulted from differing interpretations of data 
completeness between the private supplier and Road B. For example, while the supplier believed that a 
short description of the activity performed was enough (“button pressed”), Road B also expected some 
contextual information (e.g. the cause of the failure) [19] and thus required additional data from the 
supplier. Information transformation activities also proved to be complex for Road B, as the data they 
received from the supplier was provided in the wrong format [20] and hence messy. For example, while 
Road B specified specific fields in a standard form to capture information (e.g. number of hours worked, 
type of failure), the supplier simply put all this information into the ‘description’ field and left the other 
fields in the form blank. This required Road B t  reorganise the supplier’s data, leading to long 
transformation lead-times and information being obsolete before it was even used [21]. Interviewees 
furthermore mentioned that Road B’s system could not manage 3D files, forcing the team to convert 
these into 2D files and leading to a loss of data [22]. Road B acknowledged that reducing the messiness 
of the supplier’s data required flexibility to deviate from the i itial agreements, as these turned out to 
not be specific enough. 
Contractual and relational governance in relation to information processing – Road B’s contract 
had the same data-sharing clauses as found in Road A’s contract, i.e. control clauses to ensure data-
gathering and coordination clauses to govern data-sharing. The contract also specified the direct link 
between the asset management systems of both partners, including which data fields should be 
connected to ensure correct and complete data [25]. The interviewees, however, indicated that the 
asset management system had been upgraded after the start of the contract, while the related contract 
clauses referred to a prior version of the system [26]. Hence, the direct link could not be established. 
Contract clauses related to information transformation activities were sparsely present as interviewees 
indicated that specifying information requirements in contracts was not easy: “The biggest problem is 
that internal information needs and contract requirements are not working together” [32]. Road B 
considered clauses to ‘set things in stone’, while flexibility was actually needed to deal with changing 

































































information needs: “You have to be flexible; you cannot afford to be rigid anymore”. For example, 
following a major incident at one of their sluices, Road B needed additional information to demonstrate 
that users of the sluice had not been endangered and that sufficient actions had been taken to avoid 
similar issues in the future. As such, situations were difficult to forecast, the contract had to allow for 
requiring additional information from the supplier. Lastly, the specification document of Road B’s 
contract included clauses requiring the team to organise recurring performance evaluation meetings 
with the supplier [33], but did not contain any specific information on meeting content and parties’ 
roles. As a result, Road B had to rely on other governance mechanisms to determine the roles of the 
parties involved and to ensure the right information is obtained. 
To promote data sharing, the supplier was penalised in case they did not deliver, but this penalty 
was found to be insufficient to deter divergent behaviour: “They do get a penalty, but that it was 
sometimes much less than what they save if they do nothing” (Asset Manager 3). Several members of 
Road B’s regional asset management team however indicated to refrain from penalising suppliers as 
much as possible [29], as this might make the supplier hesitant to share data in the future [27]. Contract 
Manager 2 indicated that the team focused instead on collaboration (“Our goal is to work with the 
market”), as to build a trusting relationship and to enhance information sharing [31]. By showing that 
information was needed for proper asset management rather than for penalising the supplier, and that 
flexibility was required to respond to changing information needs [36], Road B hoped to move the 
supplier away from strictly following contractual agreements: “A supplier always checks: ‘what is in it for 
me?’ They will not provide an additional service that is not prescribed in the contract” (Contract Manager 
2). Investing in collaboration also paid off with respect to Road B’s information-transformation activities, 
because the collaboration involved establishing a common goal. Contract Manager 2, for example, 
mentioned that Road B and the supplier started to assess data of the assets jointly [35], which helped to 
combine expertise and allowed for developing a shared understanding.
Overall, Road B experienced extensive information uncertainty. Road B’s difficulties with 
determining their data needs resulted in imprecise and ineffective clauses to control access to data, 
while basing clauses to coordinate the data transfer (i.e. the how of data sharing) on wrong system 
configurations led to incomplete datasets regarding their assets. Moreover, incentive schemes appeared 
to be ineffective which led to additional issues with data sharing. Road B also invested substantial time 
in relational mechanisms including building a collaborative and trusting relationship with their supplier, 
which fostered open information sharing, and provided flexibility to deal with gaps in contracts. Similar 

































































to Road A, Road B also experienced that relational governance was insufficient in complementing 
incomplete and poorly specified contractual mechanisms, causing Road B to miss data still. 
Road B showed that it experienced limited information equivocality, as Road B was able to 
leverage their supplier’s expertise for the purpose of transformation activities. The joint transformation 
activities were mainly supported by relational governance (including collaborative relationships, 
common goals and trust), while contractual governance was sparsely used to outline the basics of the 
joint activities (e.g. having recurring meetings).
4.2 Digital transformation in the public-private relationships at Rail
For decades, Rail has relied on data collected by specialised inspection trains, equipped with sensors and 
cameras, to manage and maintain their assets. Inspection trains, however, only scanned the rail network 
a couple of times a year, and hence, data could only be used to take preventive maintenance decisions. 
In order to obtain real-time data, Rail invested in sensors, mounted to the rail network, and partnered 
up with a semi-public train operator to obtain more continuous data streams by fitting fourteen 
passenger trains with sensors that provided Rail with daily reports from which potential ‘harbingers’ of 
failures could be detected (Management Plan 2019, pp. 19-20). Furthermore, a Data Lab (established in 
2017) combined different data flows and developed failure prediction algorithms. These two 
developments enabled Rail to “use data in a smart way, which means that we, for example, together 
with suppliers prevent failures and obtain earlier insights into when an object needs to be replaced” 
(Management Plan 2018, p. 39), and to manage their network: “Without data, you have no control and 
no oversight. We need that data to know how our assets perform and how it affects train movements” 
(Project Manager 1). 
Similar to Road, Rail also faced an ‘extended responsibility’ with respect to the availability and 
safety of the rail infrastructure, and hence required timely and accurate information about their assets. 
When maintenance activities took too long or were performed too late (leading to extended periods of 
non-availability of railway segments and possibly to unsafe situations), both the public and the Dutch 
government would hold Rail accountable and not the private maintenance suppliers. As a result, Rail A’s 
asset management team preferred to exert more control in the relationship with their private supplier: 
“We have to build in even more clauses [in the contract] where we can take more control. This is because 
we are the ones who, if things go wrong, are on the evening news again and not the supplier” (Assistant 
Area Manager, Rail A). Rail B illustrated the difference between their goals and the supplier’s as follows: 
“The supplier has commercial interests, besides that they have heart for the railways and enjoy 

































































performing maintenance. But in the end, the supplier also looks at what they can earn with it. Rail has a 
different assignment. We have to keep the rail track available for carriers and travellers” (Assistant Area 
Manager, Rail B). While suppliers were satisfied with data demonstrating they had completed their job 
(e.g. descriptions of failures and measures taken), both Rail A and B required additional data about the 
impact of maintenance on availability (e.g. length of the activity, potential differences between 
expected maintenance time vs. actual time, etc.) to safeguard societal interests (e.g. a safe rail network).
In order to capitalise on the opportunities provided by DT, Rail took the lead in implementing 
digital technologies, rather than relying on suppliers or collaborating with them. Rail believed that in 
their specific sector they were in the best position to take the lead as they had access to more data than 
individual private suppliers did: “A supplier only has data from their own area, and thus has far fewer 
data points than we do. So, we are the only ones in a position to do these predictions” (Data Scientist). 
Embracing digital technologies enabled Rail to predict potential problems regarding network availability 
using data from their national database, for example regarding heating elements in railroad switches: 
“We built sensors in the tracks to measure the temperature of the railroad to avoid switches being 
flooded with snow, because otherwise you have an availability problem” (Assistant Area Manager, Rail 
B). Although Rail led the implementation of digital technologies, they still required specialised input 
from their private suppliers: “As an asset manager, I would very much like to know: ‘is my infrastructure 
deteriorating in the way we expected? And do the maintenance activities performed by a supplier benefit 
that pattern or does it deteriorate too much or too little?’” (Area Manager 1). Private suppliers’ expertise 
in maintenance helped Rail to understand their assets better, to smarten the actual maintenance 
activities, and to achieve efficiency gains. Despite significant investments in digital technologies, Rail’s 
technicians (who had been trained in the management and maintenance of technical systems) 
continued to be largely unfamiliar with the use of data and their potential. This resulted in a low 
adoption rate of data in asset management processes, and suppliers being only sparsely allowed to use 
their own digital technologies to smarten the maintenance of the area they were responsible for: “I 
think we are still at a stage where we are slowing down the suppliers. This stems from our historical 
conservatism” (Area Manager 2, Rail A).
Rail A focused on the north-western part of the Netherlands and included the management and 
maintenance of the railroad network including a pivotal central train station. A major failure at that train 
station would cause the majority of the Dutch timetables to be disrupted. Rail B mainly worked on 
railroad networks in the south-eastern part of the Netherlands that connected several major cities. Rail 
had centralised its maintenance service tendering process and aimed to ensure that regional asset 

































































management teams acted in a uniform way. However, closer examination of the cases revealed regional 
differences with respect to levels of information uncertainty and equivocality experienced, and the mix 
of contractual and relational governance mechanisms deployed. These differences are discussed in the 
next sections. The evidence referred to has been captured in Tables 4a and 4b.
< Please insert Tables 4a and 4b here. >
4.2.1 Rail A
Information processing activities – Both the regional asset management team and the supplier manually 
entered data into Rail’s central asset management system [37]. These data helped with monitoring 
assets’ conditions and the supplier’s performance, and allowed enriching the data Rail gathered 
themselves. The supplier was contractually required to collect data about their operational activities and 
to share that data with Rail upon request [38]. However, interviewees raised concerns about the private 
supplier’s apparent reluctance to share data: “Certain information is not provided, not correct, not 
complete, or does not meet the requirements” [39]. Nevertheless, information uncertainty was relatively 
limited due to the extensive data-gathering activities performed by Rail A. Data transformation was 
generally performed by Rail A, but interviewees indicated challenges regarding the resources available 
to check and verify all supplier-provided data, which seemed uncleaned and incomplete [40]. As a result, 
the database looked messy and Rail A needed to perform structuring of the data, leading to a continuing 
discrepancy between the information in Rail A’s systems and reality. Another challenge was that Rail A 
struggled to determine which data were crucial and how to use them [41]. Overall, Rail A faced rather 
extensive information equivocality. 
Contractual and relational governance in relation to information processing – The contract 
explicitly stipulated that the supplier should gather and share data on Rail A’s assets [42,43] (i.e. 
control). However, being short on capacity [44], the team was unable to check whether they received all 
data they required, which allowed the supplier to reduce efforts in areas that were not checked: “Then 
the supplier’s ‘beeping system’ [acting only when the other party asks for something (‘beeps’)] comes 
around:  ‘I do not deliver; and I will see if I hear something’” (Regional Contract Manager 1). Suppliers 
simply ‘forgot’ to share gathered data when Rail A did not actively enforce the contractual agreements 
that stipulated data sharing [45,46]. In order to manage data transformation activities, Area Manager 2 
indicated that he heavily relied on contractual control, with the contract stipulating that suppliers 
should transform maintenance and inspection data to information that demonstrates whether 
requirements have been met [50]. This again required Rail A to check meticulously the submission of 
transformation reports and their contents, which was unfeasible because of limited capacity [51].

































































Limited evidence was found regarding a systematic use of relational governance mechanisms in 
support of data-gathering and sharing. In fact, rather than having a trusting relationship, interviewees 
indicated distrust between Rail A and their suppliers. Fearing consequences, Rail A’s suppliers shared a 
minimal accepted amount of data (i.e. just showing enough to keep Rail A satisfied) [47], and even hid 
specific data that might put them in a bad daylight [48]. For example, when an inspection by the supplier 
revealed an issue at a specific asset that could easily be fixed, the supplier sometimes chose to fix it 
without reporting it to Rail A to avoid a potential penalty. While Regional Contract Manager 1 argued 
that relational governance was not invoked in order to comply with European tendering regulations 
[49], the team did (at times) resort to relational governance mechanisms. For example, increasing 
collaboration and information sharing with the supplier’s operational employees helped Assistant Area 
Manager 1 to find out that the supplier’s managers highlighted information that supported them in 
meeting contracted KPIs, while being less clear regarding information that was less favourable to their 
performance [52,53]. Setting up joint information transformation activities through relational 
governance mechanisms was found to be challenging however because common goals and increased 
levels of collaboration could provide the current supplier with an advantage over competitors, which 
would be in conflict with tendering regulations [54].
In sum, Rail A experienced limited information uncertainty due to their own extensive data 
gathering activities and strong control over the data that were collected by their supplier. Control was 
exercised by having clear contractual agreements that indicated which data the supplier should collect 
and how data should be shared. Additionally, Rail A aimed to check actively the completeness and 
correctness of the data collected by the supplier. Staff shortages, however, prevented Rail A from 
checking all data, and consequently, their databases contained gaps.  Relational governance was not 
developed as Rail A was afraid that too much collaboration and openness with the private supplier 
would violate EU tendering regulations. Instead, the strong focus on contractual control seemed to 
create distrust between Rail A and the private supplier even. 
Rail A experienced extensive information equivocality as they performed most transformation 
activities themselves. The few transformation activities to be performed by the supplier were governed 
by contractual coordination clauses specifying which data needed to be transformed into what kind of 
information (i.e. what purposes the information would serve). As these clauses were not clear on how 
information would be further interpreted by both parties, the supplier presented information only 
selectively (to ensure that the supplier’s own work was presented in the best possible light), which then 

































































required Rail A to check incoming information actively. Again, staff shortages prevented Rail A from 
conducting a complete and systematic check of all incoming information. 
4.2.2 Rail B
Information processing activities – Similar to Rail A, Rail B used the central asset management system to 
store and share data regarding maintenance activities performed on assets and inspections: “It actually 
contains everything about such a failure. What happened, what they did about it.” [55]. Additionally, Rail 
gathered data using sensors and inspection trains [56,57]. This suggested that information-gathering 
activities were well developed and that information uncertainty was relatively limited as Rail B received 
the required data. With respect to data transformation, Rail B relied heavily on data scientists in their 
Data Lab to, for instance, transform heat sensor data to predict possible freezing of railroad switches so 
that they could be serviced on time. However, Area Manager 3 [58] stated that the supplier was 
involved in data transformation (e.g. jointly discussing performance deviations to understand better why 
performance was not as expected) because of limited internal resources, and because inputs from the 
supplier were required to transform data. Considering the inputs required from the supplier, 
equivocality was relatively extensive.
Contractual and relational governance in relation to information processing – Contractual 
coordination mechanisms played a dominant role in motivating the supplier to gather and share data 
[59,60], with Rail B enforcing the contractual agreements by exerting  control [61]. More specifically, the 
regional asset management team regularly inspected their assets, and occasionally (e.g. when assets 
were found to not have been properly maintained, or when inconsistencies emerged between their 
database and reality) requested additional data to investigate what happened and to what extent the 
supplier was responsible [59]. Similar to Rail A, Rail B had not negotiated any specific contractual 
agreements with respect to transforming data, other than the transformations required to demonstrate 
contract compliance [65]. Instead, Rail B mostly relied on their own employees to perform 
transformation activities.
The regional asset management team felt that the supplier did not share all available data [62], 
and indicated that trust was limited. The team therefore opted for more flexible contract application, as 
to build a more trusting relationship: “There has to be a bit of a balance in it [enforcing penalties], you 
cannot address everything. But it [managing incentives] has to stay manageable” (Regional Contract 
Manager 2). Moreover, Rail B pursued openness by explaining the need for the contractual agreements 
[64], and how they would be applied, as to create shared behavioural expectations that could help in 

































































developing joint goals. By investing in relational norms (that acted as a reference guide on how both 
parties intended to collaborate with each other), the team could actively discuss and share information 
with the private supplier in support of the data transformation performed by Rail’s employees and could 
motivate their supplier to go beyond the minimum requirements [63,67,68].
Overall, Rail B experienced relatively limited information uncertainty as data sharing was 
effectively supported by contractual control clauses that clearly specified which data the supplier 
needed to collect and how they should be shared. Contractual enforcement was very strict, involving the 
checking of incoming data and inspecting the work suppliers performed on their assets. Because of this 
strict enforcement, Rail B initially experienced limited trust at the supplier. In response Rail B increased 
openness by explaining why data were needed and why Rail B was strict in applying the contract, but 
also sought to apply the contract in a more flexible way (e.g. by not directly penalising for a deviation by 
the supplier). Rail B thus applied relational governance to a limited extent to complement the contract.
Rail B experienced rather extensive information equivocality. As Rail B performed the majority of 
transformation activities themselves, the contract only included some coordination clauses that guided 
the transformation activities that the supplier needed to perform to demonstrate contract compliance. 
Rail B noted, however, that their own expertise was insufficient to transform all data effectively, and 
hence resorted to relational governance, i.e. implementing relational norms to ensure Rail B could tap 
into the supplier’s expertise for performing the transformations.
5. Cross-case analysis 
This section presents the main findings from the cross-case analysis. The role of contractual governance 
in relation to information asymmetry is first analysed, followed by the role of relational governance in 
relation to information asymmetry. Figure 1 illustrates the key concepts and their relationships as 
discussed in the cross-case analysis. It highlights that information gathering and sharing activities help 
address information uncertainty and that in IORs such activities are mainly supported by contractual 
mechanisms complemented with relational mechanisms. Information transformation activities help 
address information equivocality and these activities are mainly supported by relational mechanisms 
complemented with contractual mechanisms.
< Please insert Figure 1 here. >

































































5.1 The role of contractual governance in addressing information asymmetry
Road A and B showed that ineffective contractual control and coordination caused issues with data 
gathering activities, which in turn were associated with extensive information uncertainty. In contrast to 
the Road cases, both Rail A and B experienced limited uncertainty, as they were able to rely on effective 
contractual controls to manage their data gathering and sharing activities. As such, the cross-case 
findings demonstrated that information uncertainty was effectively addressed by using contractual 
control and coordination functions that allowed access to data collected at external parties. No evidence 
was found across the cases that contractual control and coordination could effectively be used to 
manage transformation activities and address information equivocality. In fact, Rail A and B experienced 
extensive equivocality while relying on contractual coordination to manage transformation activities, 
while Road A and B, which hardly relied on contractual governance, experienced limited equivocality.
Road’s contracts required suppliers to share all data they collected regarding Road’s assets and 
had incentive schemes tied to these requirements [8,23,24,25]. Where Road A’s contract contained 
provisions specifying how data should be shared, Road B’s contract either lacked such provisions or 
contained provisions based on incorrect assumptions. Specific agreements indicating which data should 
be shared were lacking in both cases. Finally, b th contracts experienced issues with the designed 
incentive schemes since Road A’s supplier preferred to pay the penalty rather than invest money to be 
able to meet contract requirements. While Road A expected their supplier to act as if they were the 
owner of the assets, which would lead them to maximise the value for society as a whole and thus 
actively gather and share information, the supplier (as a profit maximising private party) in that 
relationship aimed to maximise their profits by doing as little as possible, thereby underplaying societal 
benefits. Road B’s supplier followed the contract to the letter, questioning each data request, fearing to 
be penalised as it also sought to maximise its own value. Together, the cross-case findings suggested 
that contracts could help in establishing processes related to data gathering and sharing, provided that 
sufficiently clear specifications have been developed and incentive schemes have been appropriately 
designed. Too much focus on control (e.g. rigidly enforcing penalties) might render contracts less 
efficient as evidenced by the recent shift at Road towards a more collaborative approach with respect to 
their suppliers: “It is no longer about pointing fingers at each other” (Configuration Manager 1, Road A). 
Rail’s contracts stipulated which data suppliers should share [42,43,60], but Rail had difficulties in 
specifying data needs and capturing these needs in contract clauses. Incoming data were actively 
checked and suppliers were penalised in case of non-compliance: “Those incentives work immediately. If 
you hit them in their wallet, you immediately hit them hardest and they are sensitive to that” (Assistant 

































































Area Manager 1). This only worked, however, as long as contractual agreements were consistently 
enforced, as was the case for Rail A. Staff shortages inhibited Rail A to monitor all incoming data streams 
and check the completeness of data. This led to gaps in their database, as the supplier did typically not 
supply data that was not checked by Rail A. Rail B, on the other hand, did have sufficient resources to 
check all incoming data. This allowed them to enforce contracts better and to ensure that all data 
collected by the supplier was actually shared with Rail B. 
Data transformation processes could not effectively be addressed using contractual control and 
coordination. Both contracts at Road required suppliers to present progress reports periodically by 
transforming inspection and maintenance data into asset condition information [14,33]. Despite these 
provisions, both regional asset management teams felt they were not receiving what they really needed 
from the private supplier in terms of information. This inability to define information requirements by 
the public organisation inhibited capturing these requirements more explicitly in contracts [4,32], 
causing the supplier to be confused about what data were required. Using the contract’s control 
function ensured that some basic data transformation activities took place (“the supplier must provide a 
progress report”, Contract Manager, Road A), but these did not necessarily address Road’s information 
requirements. The coordination function was only sparsely used for the purpose of data transformation 
in both cases. The contracts outlined, for example, the basics of the collaboration by prescribing regular 
meetings and the presence of both partners, but did not stipulate the specifics about, for example, 
which partner should perform what transformation. Rail A’s contract, in contrast, had more elaborated 
clauses aimed at coordinating data transformation activities, including specifications of the information 
Rail A wanted to receive [50]. As the contract was not clear on how information would be interpreted or 
used by the public organisation, the private supplier tended to present information selectively according 
to their interests. Rail B’s contract delegated few transformation activities to the supplier [65]. For the 
majority of data transformation activities, Rail B relied on internal resources and capabilities. 
In sum, both contractual control and coordination were found to be effective in addressing 
information uncertainty. Formal contracts turned out, however, to be less effective in addressing 
information equivocality. 
5.2 The role of relational governance in addressing information asymmetry
Even though Road A and B invested in relational governance, both still experienced extensive 
information uncertainty. Rail A, which did not rely on relational governance, and Rail B, where relational 
governance played a minor role, actually experienced limited uncertainty. As such, the cross-case 

































































findings showed that information uncertainty could not effectively be addressed by investing more in 
relational governance. Rather, section 5.2 demonstrated that uncertainty was effectively addressed by 
clear contractual terms that support data sharing between partners, and this should be complemented 
by relational governance to foster trust to create transparency. With respect to information 
equivocality, the cross-case evidence suggested that relational governance was effective for addressing 
information equivocality. Road A and B both relied mostly on relational governance to effectively 
manage their transformation activities, with a complementary role for contractual governance in setting 
basic rules for joint activities. In turn, Road A and B experienced limited equivocality. The Rail A and B 
cases showed that not relying on relational governance, or only to a limited extent, while extensively 
using contractual governance actually increased equivocality.
The limited role of relational governance in gathering data from suppliers was especially evident 
at Road. Motivated by the organisation-wide strategy of ‘collaborating with the market’ [28,29,30], Road 
began transforming their transactional relationships into more collaborative ones, thereby creating 
bilateral expectations regarding data sharing and how data could be used to more efficiently organise 
maintenance activities. Road B focused on relational norms that fostered flexibility, which was needed 
to improve the interpretation of contractual agreements together with their private supplier. Rather 
than immediately penalising the private supplier for a contract deviation, the supplier first got an 
opportunity to explore the deviation and address it. The fact that the private supplier was allowed this 
‘manoeuvring space’ demonstrated flexibility and made them more willing to sometimes ‘go beyond 
and above’ what was stipulated in the contract. Furthermore, while merely requesting data used to 
result in reluctance to share data by the private supplier, explaining more about data usage (by the 
public organisation) was found to increase the supplier’s willingness to collect and share data. Trusting 
relationships enabled Road to increase transparency with respect to the contract clauses, which 
motivated the supplier to share data more freely [12,28]. Moreover, collaborative relationships helped 
both parties to build a mutual understanding and develop joint goals regarding data collection. Similar 
to Road B, Rail B’s regional asset management team discussed deviations together with the supplier and 
identified joint solutions, which fostered data sharing by the supplier [58]. Discussing deviations and 
associated root-causes built trust in the relationship and supported data acquisition and sharing 
activities. In contrast to the relational approach adopted by Rail B, Rail A did not rely much on relational 
governance mechanisms to support data gathering and sharing. For example, Rail A was afraid that if 
they were too transparent, they might provide too much information to their supplier (providing them 
with an advantage over other potential suppliers) and hence infringe on European tendering 

































































regulations. As such, Rail A rigidly enforced the contract and was unable to avert distrust. Consequently, 
the private supplier provided only the bare minimum in data (as per the contract), fearing that sharing 
too much data would be used against them by Rail A [47,48].
Regarding transformation activities, Road’s strategy to collaborate more closely with suppliers 
helped in building trust, which created transparency, and establishing collaborative relationships in 
which shared objectives could be identified. This motivated parties to engage in joint information 
transformation activities that helped limit the messiness of information and enabled the joint 
development of a dashboard to monitor the states of sluice doors with real-time information (Road B). 
Furthermore, both cases at Road focused on the benefits that partners could obtain from relevant 
information and that simultaneously addressed their converging goals (e.g. more efficient maintenance 
for the supplier providing higher profits, more efficient asset management for Road providing a higher 
availability of the network) [16,17,35]. Creating such common objectives helped to motivate Road and 
their suppliers to transform data, both individually and jointly, thereby limiting the messiness of 
information. Rail, in contrast, relied heavily on internal resources for transformation activities, with 
limited opportunities for suppliers to engage with the public organisation in a joint transformation 
process. Rail A did not invest in building a trusting relationship with the supplier, since Rail A believed 
that any data transformation activities that the supplier could perform would only result in 
“fragmented, or even tainted, information”. Table 4b shows, for example, that the supplier’s 
management and their engineers had diverging ideas about performance [53]. While the supplier’s 
engineers tried to perform as if they ‘owned’ the assets that they were maintaining (i.e. more aligned 
with Rail A’s interest to lower the number of failures and thus increase availability), their management 
more strictly followed the contract (i.e. performing enough maintenance to meet minimum contract 
requirements and maximise their profit). This led to differences in how both parties interpreted 
information regarding the supplier’s performance and the assets’ availability. Rail B invested in 
establishing relational norms (i.e. setting up a reference guide for their intended collaboration), with the 
intention of motivating the private supplier to go beyond the letter of the contract and to propose 
possible data transformation opportunities other than those prescribed in the contract [67]. This 
approach was described by both parties as creating more flexibility in the relationship, which was 
needed to address emerging issues and to consider the relationship a partnership (rather than a 
transactional relationship) involving both partners to maintain the rail network as effectively as possible 
as to increase network availability. 

































































In sum, relational governance mechanisms were found to be less effective when addressing 
information uncertainty and to at most complement the required contractual governance 
mechanisms. Relational governance mechanism (i.e. relational norms and trust) were effective in 
addressing information equivocality.
6. Discussion
Drawing on IPT, we posit that information uncertainty and equivocality in relationships undergoing DT 
are addressed by data-gathering (and sharing) and transformation activities. Our investigation of four 
public-private relationships shows that both contractual and relational governance mechanisms can be 
used, but in different roles, to manage information asymmetry. 
6.1 Theoretical contributions 
This study contributes to inter-organisational governance and DT research. First, this study draws out 
how DT affects information uncertainty and equivocality. Digital technologies may reduce information 
uncertainty by enhancing both the quantity and quality of data available for decision-making (Sternberg 
et al., 2020). In the context of smart sensors, our findings show that they enable data to be collected in 
real-time and that measurements tend to be more accurate. Advanced data analytics tools (Frank et al., 
2019) enable combining data from different sources (e.g. SCADA and asset management systems, 
weather forecasts) and with expertise of relevant specialists (e.g. asset utilisation, the impact of weather 
conditions), thereby reducing equivocality. The findings, however, demonstrate that merely having 
these technological solutions in place does not guarantee enhanced information-processing. Rather, 
challenges in data acquisition and transformation activities are the result of organisational aspects of 
organisations that implemented technologies and to the management of their IORs in which data from 
these technologies play a role. This is especially true for public-private relationships, which are 
characterised by different information processing needs. The public organisations in our study serve the 
public by providing safe, reliable and affordable transport to citizens, and are held accountable by the 
national government in case of failures (e.g. low availability, accidents). As a result, these public 
organisations ‘need to know more than they buy’ (Flowers, 2007), and hence require more information 
than suppliers would generally be inclined to provide (e.g. not only showing that a repair was made, but 
also that the failure did not impact safety). Based on our findings, we also show that public organisations 
and private suppliers differ in their main objectives (i.e. high availability versus maintenance volume) 
which, as shown in our case findings, caused both parties in the public-private relationship to make 

































































different decisions using the same information (e.g. postponing maintenance versus performing it now). 
We thus find that merely equipping assets with digital technologies does not yield any benefits if private 
suppliers fail to act upon the data these technologies generate and if data are not shared between 
partners. Thus, information-processing activities need to be properly organised (to ensure that both 
partners in the relationship contribute to the effective execution of the necessary processing activities) 
if public-private relationships are to reap the benefits that digital technologies can provide. Governance 
mechanisms can play a key role by explicating rules and operating procedures as well as by providing 
relationship-governing guidelines for data collection, sharing and transformation.
Second, this study theoretically and empirically contributes to inter-organisational governance 
literature by investigating the roles of contractual and relational governance mechanisms with regard to 
addressing information asymmetry in relationships undergoing DT. This is important because separate, 
yet interdependent, data collection and analysis activities increase organisations’ strategic inter-
dependence (Mahapatra et al., 2010) in successfully exploiting data-driven decision-making. As 
evidenced in our cases, effective deployment of both governance mechanisms helps to address 
information asymmetry. However, different governance mechanisms are needed depending on the 
nature of information asymmetry. More specifically, information-gathering and sharing between 
partners can be explicated and stipulated using contracts’ control and coordination functions geared at 
supporting collecting data and sharing it with the public organisation. To be useful for both parties in the 
relationship, these contractual control and coordination provisions need further detail and clarification 
regarding, for example, the format in which data should be collected and shared and the desired levels 
of detail. The contractually stipulated incentive schemes also need to be proportional (Selviaridis and 
Van der Valk, 2019) if data-gathering and sharing is to achieve the desired levels. In other words, 
incentive schemes need to include both penalties and bonuses, and these are required at levels that 
incentivise suppliers to put effort into data gathering and sharing. Furthermore, organisations might 
benefit from more extensive use of coordination clauses aimed at establishing communication routines 
(e.g. frequency and detail of regular meetings) to exchange data and increase their nderstanding of 
each other’s information requirements. Contractual mechanisms are found to be less prominent in data 
transformation activities. One plausible explanation seems to lie in the difficulty of defining information 
requirements in advance of DT with both parties struggling to define and bound precise specifications 
for data transformation. Also, when data acquisition and sharing are not properly organised via a 
contract’s coordination clauses, information transformation between parties is limited.  Data acquisition 
first needs to be properly organised, before organisations seek to organise transformation activities.

































































Our study finds that data acquisition and sharing mainly benefit from the use of relational 
governance such as trust and relational norms. Where trusting relationships are developed, suppliers 
are more open about the data they collected and engaged more frequently in discussions regarding 
potential issues and new ideas with respect to using collected data to optimise their. Establishing 
collaboration and setting joint objectives aid partners in developing a clear perspective on what kind of 
data are required for what purpose. This may successfully be achieved by developing relational norms as 
these create a bilateral expectation (Cannon et al., 2000) that parties will proactively provide relevant 
(and often beyond contractually stipulated) information to their partner, and thus support decision-
making in the relationship. Furthermore, in the presence of trust, parties are more likely to spend time 
collecting and sharing data (Inkpen and Tsang, 2005). Trust also plays a vital role with respect to data 
transformation activities by increasing collaboration and information exchange between partners, and it 
helps them to share objectives with each other more freely. Increasing levels of trust between 
partnering organisations, as trust is an important enabler for effective information sharing, helps them 
to actively provide useful information and openly discuss data collected and possible interpretations, 
thereby aligning interpretations and allowing joint synthesis of information.
6.2 Boundary conditions and further research
In this study, the roles of governance mechanisms in addressing information asymmetry in public-
private relationships during DT are closely examined. While our findings are relevant to public and 
private organisations beyond the investigated sectors and country, future research should compare our 
findings with other types of relationships (private-private or involving NGOs) and other sectors with 
different characteristics (e.g. different clock speed or types of products/services). This may have an 
impact on how information asymmetry is addressed. For instance, relationships in fast-moving product 
industries may not have the time to collect, analyse and transfer rich information, and may rely on other 
means to address information asymmetry. In addition, the investigated public-private relationships are 
characterised by possible diverging goals and objectives (e.g. social vs. economic value) which may lead 
to further information asymmetry and thus making them an ideal context for our study. Future research 
should investigate other types of relationships where goals and objectives might be more aligned (e.g. 
joint economic value creation and appropriation) and their impact on information asymmetry and the 
use of both governance mechanisms. 
This study focuses on a particular type of digital technology. Other types of digital technologies, 
such as the use of block chain technology to secure information transfers, should be investigated too to 

































































obtain a broader view of how different technologies affect information asymmetry. Moreover, 
investigating the findings in countries with different legal practices (i.e. different legal systems, 
importance of different contract types) may affect the role both governance mechanisms play in 
addressing information asymmetry. Finally, this study leverages many sources of data including 
interviews, observations, contracts and archival data. Future studies may use behavioural experiments 
to uncover the role that different individuals play in using both governance mechanisms to address 
information asymmetry. For instance, further work should explore whom, at what level (e.g. business, 
corporate, subsidiary) and in what job role (e.g. legal, engineering, supply chain) uses what type of 
governance mechanism to gather, analyse and transfer information. 
6.3 Implications for practice 
This study has important implications for organisations and managers seeking to use governance 
mechanisms to address information asymmetry in relationships undergoing DT. Adopting and 
implementing digital technologies as such will not enhance information-processing capacity (as shown in 
the case where not enough staff was present to transform collected information) and capabilities (as 
specific expertise from the relationship partners needs to be combined), unless organisational and 
relationship management aspects associated with DT are properly dealt with. (Public) Organisations 
embarking on DT should therefore carefully consider how this would affect their relationships and their 
dealings with (private) partners, but also how processes, resources and structures may need to be 
adapted internally to deal with increased data and informatio . Our study provides valuable levers for 
the effective deployment of contractual and relational governance mechanisms in supporting 
information processing activities and the management of information asymmetry in IORs. 
In order to deploy both governance mechanisms effectively, organisations should first develop a 
thorough understanding of their own information requirements (including, but not limited to questions 
around, what, when, how, why and who) in relation to operational and contractual decision-making as 
well as the information requirements of partners. While information requirements may be clear in some 
areas, our study revealed that in most cases it is not. Public organisations may have difficulties 
identifying their essential information requirements. Organisations (and especially public ones) may lack 
crucial and specialised technical knowledge of the operational tasks of maintenance that they have 
outsourced to private suppliers. Additionally, public organisations typically work with tight budgets that 
do not allow simultaneous investments in current and new maintenance processes supported by digital 
technologies. Taken together, these issues inhibit organisations from developing a clear understanding 

































































of their information requirements. Increased collaboration with suppliers may foster such 
understanding, as suppliers are likely to be able to help establish and address information requirements 
based on their experiences with other customers and sectors. However, collaboration is problematic as 
public organisations and their private suppliers have diverging interests, leading public organisations to 
require higher quantities and quality of information than other (private) customers. Moreover, public 
organisations tend to refrain from too close collaborations with suppliers to avoid supplier lock-ins or 
the unintended creation of unfair competition between current and potential suppliers, thus making 
collaborative public-private relationships more difficult to achieve. 
When information requirements are sufficiently clear, contracts should explicitly stipulate these 
information requirements and what data are required. Associated incentives schemes should be 
proportional and functional to be effective. Our research provides specific insights into how contractual 
and relational governance mechanisms help coordinate information-processing activities. Contracts help 
establish data-gathering and transformation processes by facilitating communication and information 
transfer, thereby reducing the information uncertainty that the relationship faces. Relational 
mechanisms may strengthen this relationship as trust, openness and establishing common goals help to 
refine both parties’ understanding of information requirements. Relational mechanisms play an even 
more important role in transformation activities as strong relationships help to develop the skills 
required for understanding the information held jointly. Joint problem-solving helps to develop the 
information structuring and evaluation skills of individual decision-makers in the relationship.
7. Conclusion
This paper explored how organisations in public-private relationships use contractual and relational 
governance mechanisms to organise information-processing activities in addressing information 
uncertainty and equivocality during DT. Information-gathering and sharing activities can be made 
explicit and can be stipulated in contracts, which mainly serve to reduce information uncertainty. 
Information transformation and dissemination activities are predominantly supported by relational 
mechanisms including trust, flexibility and joint problem-solving to address information equivocality. 
Our findings show that organisations need to first organise data acquisition and sharing ac ivities before 
they can embark on organising data transformation activities (internally and with their partner). We are 
hopeful that these insights will encourage further research to refine our understanding of the roles of 
both governance mechanisms in addressing information asymmetry during DT.


































































Alvesson, M. (2003), “Beyond neopositivists, romantics, and localists: A reflexive approach to interviews 
in organizational research”, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 28 No. 1, pp. 13–33.
Baldus, B.J. and Hatton, L. (2020), “U.S. chief procurement officers’ perspectives on public 
procurement”, Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, Vol. 26 No. 1.
Barratt, M., Choi, T.Y. and Li, M. (2011), “Qualitative case studies in operations management: Trends, 
research outcomes, and future research implications”, Journal of Operations Management, Vol. 
29 No. 4, pp. 329–342.
Blome, C., Schoenherr, T. and Kaesser, M. (2013), “Ambidextrous governance in supply chains: The 
impact on innovation and cost performance”, Journal of Supply Chain Management, Vol. 49 No. 
4, pp. 59–80.
Bode, C., Wagner, S.M., Petersen, K.J. and Ellram, L.M. (2011), “Understanding responses to supply chain 
disruptions: Insights from information processing and resource dependence perspectives”, 
Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 54 No. 4, pp. 833–856.
Bokrantz, J., Skoogh, A., Berlin, C. and Stahre, J. (2020), “Smart maintenance: Instrument development, 
content validation and an empirical pilot”, International Journal of Operations & Production 
Management, Vol. 40 No. 4, pp. 481–506.
Brinch, M. (2018), “Understanding the value of big data in supply chain management and its business 
processes: Towards a conceptual framework”, International Journal of Operations & Production 
Management, Vol. 38 No. 7, pp. 1589–1614.
Burns, L.R. and Wholey, D.R. (1993), “Adoption and abandonment of matrix management programs: 
Effects of organizational characteristics and interorganizational networks”, Academy of 
Management Journal, Vol. 36 No. 1, pp. 106–138.
Cabral, S. (2017), “Reconciling conflicting policy objectives in public contracting: The enabling role of 
capabilities”, Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 54 No. 6, pp. 823–853.
Cabral, S., Mahoney, J.T., McGahan, A.M. and Potoski, M. (2019), “Value creation and value 
appropriation in public and nonprofit organizations”, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 40 No. 
4, pp. 465–475.
Caldwell, N.D., Roehrich, J.K. and Davies, A.C. (2009), “Procuring complex performance in construction: 
London Heathrow Terminal 5 and a private finance Initiative hospital”, Journal of Purchasing and 
Supply Management, Vol. 15 No. 3, pp. 178–186.
Caldwell, N.D., Roehrich, J.K. and George, G. (2017), “Social value creation and relational coordination in 
public-private collaborations”, Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 54 No. 6, pp. 906–928.
Cannon, J.P., Achrol, R.S. and Gundlach, G.T. (2000), “Contracts, norms, and plural form governance”, 
Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, Vol. 28 No. 2, pp. 180–194.

































































Cao, Z. and Lumineau, F. (2015), “Revisiting the interplay between contractual and relational 
governance: A qualitative and meta-analytic investigation”, Journal of Operations Management, 
Vol. 33–34 No. 1, pp. 15–42.
Carey, S., Lawson, B. and Krause, D.R. (2011), “Social capital configuration, legal bonds and performance 
in buyer–supplier relationships”, Journal of Operations Management, Vol. 29 No. 4, pp. 277–
288.
Carson, S.J. and John, G. (2013), “A theoretical and empirical investigation of property rights sharing in 
outsourced research, development, and engineering relationships”, Strategic Management 
Journal, Vol. 34 No. 9, pp. 1065–1085.
Chakkol, M., Selviaridis, K. and Finne, M. (2018), “The governance of collaboration in complex projects”, 
International Journal of Operations & Production Management, Vol. 38 No. 4, pp. 997–1019.
Daft, R.L. and Lengel, R.H. (1986), “Organizational information requirements, media richness and 
structural design”, Management Science, Vol. 32 No. 5, pp. 554–571.
Daft, R.L. and Weick, K.E. (1984), “Toward a model of organizations as interpretation systems”, Academy 
of Management Review, Vol. 9 No. 2, pp. 284–295.
Dahlmann, F. and Roehrich, J.K. (2019), “Sustainable supply chain management and partner engagement 
to manage climate change information”, Business Strategy Environment, Vol. 28 No. 8, pp. 
1632–1647.
Ellram, L.M. (1996), “The use of the case study method in logistics research”, Journal of Business 
Logistics, Vol. 17 No. 2, pp. 93–138.
Ellram, L.M., Tate, W.L. and Choi, T.Y. (2020), “The conflicted role of purchasing in new product 
development costing”, Journal of Supply Chain Management, Vol. 56 No. 1, pp. 3–32.
EPEC. (2017), “European PPP Expertise Centre’s (EPEC) Data Portal”, European Investment Bank, 
available at: https://data.eib.org/epec (accessed 7 March 2021).
Essig, M., Glas, A.H., Selviaridis, K. and Roehrich, J.K. (2016), “Performance-based contracting in business 
markets”, Industrial Marketing Management, Vol. 59, pp. 5–11.
Faems, D., Janssens, M., Madhok, A. and Van Looy, B. (2008), “Toward an integrative perspective on 
alliance governance: Connecting contract design, trust dynamics, and contract application”, 
Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 51 No. 6, pp. 1053–1078.
Fiol, C.M. (1994), “Consensus, diversity, and learning in organizations”, Organization Science, Vol. 5 No. 
3, pp. 403–420.
Flowers, S. (2007), “Organizational capabilities and technology acquisition: Why firms know less than 
they buy”, Industrial and Corporate Change, Vol. 16 No. 3, pp. 317–346.
Formentini, M. and Taticchi, P. (2016), “Corporate sustainability approaches and governance 
mechanisms in sustainable supply chain management”, Journal of Cleaner Production, Vol. 112, 
pp. 1920–1933.

































































Frank, A.G., Dalenogare, L.S. and Ayala, N.F. (2019), “Industry 4.0 technologies: Implementation patterns 
in manufacturing companies”, International Journal of Production Economics, Vol. 210, pp. 15–
26.
Galbraith, J.R. (1973), Designing Complex Organizations, Addison-Wesley Longman Publishing Co., 
Reading, MA.
Galbraith, J.R. (1974), “Organization design: An information processing view”, Interfaces, Vol. 4 No. 3, 
pp. 28–36.
Gattiker, T.F. and Goodhue, D.L. (2004), “Understanding the local-level costs and benefits of ERP 
through organizational information processing theory”, Information & Management, Vol. 41 No. 
4, pp. 431–443.
Ghosh, A. and Fedorowicz, J. (2008), “The role of trust in supply chain governance”, Business Process 
Management Journal, Vol. 14 No. 4, pp. 453–470.
Gibbert, M., Ruigrok, W. and Wicki, B. (2008), “What passes as a rigorous case study?”, Strategic 
Management Journal, Vol. 29 No. 13, pp. 1465–1474.
Glock, C.H., Grosse, E.H. and Ries, J.M. (2017), “Reprint of ‘Decision support models for supplier 
development: Systematic literature review and research agenda’”, International Journal of 
Production Economics, Vol. 194, pp. 246–260.
Golden-Biddle, K. and Locke, K. (2007), Composing Qualitative Research, 2nd ed., SAGE Publications, 
Thousand Oaks, CA.
Gulati, R., Wohlgezogen, F. and Zhelyazkov, P. (2012), “The two facets of collaboration: cooperation and 
coordination in strategic alliances”, Academy of Management Annals, Vol. 6 No. 1, pp. 531–583.
Halldórsson, Á. and Skjøtt-Larsen, T. (2006), “Dynamics of relationship governance in TPL arrangements 
– a dyadic perspective”, International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management, 
Vol. 36 No. 7, pp. 490–506.
Hart, O. (2003), “Incomplete contracts and public ownership: Remarks, and an application to public-
private partnerships”, The Economic Journal, Vol. 113 No. 486, pp. 69–76.
Hartmann, A., Roehrich, J., Frederiksen, L. and Davies, A. (2014), “Procuring complex performance: The 
transition process in public infrastructure”, International Journal of Operations & Production 
Management, Vol. 34 No. 2, pp. 174–194.
Hartmann, P.M., Zaki, M., Feldmann, N. and Neely, A. (2016), “Capturing value from big data – a 
taxonomy of data-driven business models used by start-up firms”, International Journal of 
Operations & Production Management, Vol. 36 No. 10, pp. 1382–1406.
Heide, J.B. and John, G. (1992), “Do norms matter in marketing relationships?”, Journal of Marketing, 
Vol. 56 No. 2, pp. 32–44.
Howard, M., Roehrich, J.K., Lewis, M.A. and Squire, B. (2019), “Converging and diverging governance 
mechanisms: The role of (dys)function in long-term inter-organisational relationships”, British 
Journal of Management, Vol. 30 No. 3, pp. 624–644.

































































Huang, F., Chen, J., Sun, L., Zhang, Y. and Yao, S. (2020), “Value-based contract for smart operation and 
maintenance service based on equitable entropy”, International Journal of Production Research, 
Vol. 58 No. 4, pp. 1271–1284.
Inkpen, A.C. and Tsang, E.W.K. (2005), “Social capital, networks, and knowledge transfer”, Academy of 
Management Review, Vol. 30 No. 1, pp. 146–165.
Jayaraman, V., Narayanan, S., Luo, Y. and Swaminathan, J.M. (2013), “Offshoring business process 
services and governance control mechanisms: An examination of service providers from India”, 
Production and Operations Management, Vol. 22 No. 2, pp. 314–334.
Jick, T.D. (1979), “Mixing qualitative and quantitative methods: Triangulation in action”, Administrative 
Science Quarterly, Vol. 24 No. 4, pp. 602–611.
Kache, F. and Seuring, S. (2017), “Challenges and opportunities of digital information at the intersection 
of Big Data Analytics and supply chain management”, International Journal of Operations & 
Production Management, Vol. 37 No. 1, pp. 10–36.
Kalra, J., Lewis, M. and Roehrich, J.K. (2021), “The manifestation of coordination failures in service 
triads”, Supply Chain Management: An International Journal, Vol. 26 No. 3, pp. 341–358.
Kapsali, M., Roehrich, J.K. and Akhtar, P. (2019), “Effective contracting for high operational performance 
in projects”, International Journal of Operations & Production Management, Vol. 39 No. 2, pp. 
294–325.
Kivleniece, I. and Quelin, B.V. (2012), “Creating and capturing value in public-private ties: A private 
actor’s perspective”, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 37 No. 2, pp. 272–299.
Klein, P.G., Mahoney, J.T., McGahan, A.M. and Pitelis, C.N. (2010), “Toward a theory of public 
entrepreneurship”, European Management Review, Vol. 7 No. 1, pp. 1–15.
Klein, P.G., Mahoney, J.T., McGahan, A.M. and Pitelis, C.N. (2019), “Organizational governance 
adaptation: Who is in, who is out, and who gets what”, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 
44 No. 1, pp. 6–27.
Kreye, M.E., Roehrich, J.K. and Lewis, M.A. (2015), “Servitising manufacturers: The impact of service 
complexity and contractual and relational capabilities”, Production Planning & Control, Vol. 26 
No. 14–15, pp. 1233–1246.
Lanzolla, G., Lorenz, A., Miron-Spektor, E., Schilling, M., Solinas, G. and Tucci, C. (2018), “Digital 
transformation: What is new if anything?”, Academy of Management Discoveries, Vol. 4 No. 3, 
pp. 378–387.
Lepak, D.P., Smith, K.G. and Taylor, M.S. (2007), “Value creation and value capture: A multilevel 
perspective”, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 32 No. 1, pp. 180–194.
Lumineau, F. (2017), “How contracts influence trust and distrust”, Journal of Management, Vol. 43 No. 
5, pp. 1553–1577.
Luo, Y. (2002), “Contract, cooperation, and performance in international joint ventures”, Strategic 
Management Journal, Vol. 23 No. 10, pp. 903–919.

































































Mahapatra, S.K., Narasimhan, R. and Barbieri, P. (2010), “Strategic interdependence, governance 
effectiveness and supplier performance: A dyadic case study investigation and theory 
development”, Journal of Operations Management, Vol. 28 No. 6, pp. 537–552.
Mahoney, J.T., McGahan, A.M. and Pitelis, C.N. (2009), “The interdependence of private and public 
interests”, Organization Science, Vol. 20 No. 6, pp. 1034–1052.
Mayer, K.J. and Argyres, N.S. (2004), “Learning to contract: Evidence from the personal computer 
industry”, Organization Science, Vol. 15 No. 4, pp. 394–410.
McCutcheon, D.M. and Meredith, J.R. (1993), “Conducting case study research in operations 
management”, Journal of Operations Management, Vol. 11 No. 3, pp. 239–256.
Mesquita, L.F. and Brush, T.H. (2008), “Untangling safeguard and production coordination effects in 
long-term buyer-supplier relationships”, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 51 No. 4, pp. 
785–807.
Miles, M.B. and Huberman, A.M. (1994), Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded Sourcebook, 2nd ed., 
SAGE Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA.
Mishra, A. and Browning, T.R. (2020), “Editorial: The innovation and project management department in 
the Journal of Operations Management”, Journal of Operations Management, Vol. 66 No. 6, pp. 
616–621.
Olsen, B.E., Haugland, S.A., Karlsen, E. and Johan Husøy, G. (2005), “Governance of complex 
procurements in the oil and gas industry”, Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, Vol. 
11 No. 1, pp. 1–13.
Olsen, T.L. and Tomlin, B. (2020), “Industry 4.0: Opportunities and challenges for operations 
management”, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, Vol. 22 No. 1, pp. 113–122.
Patton, M.Q. (1990), Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods, 2nd ed., SAGE Publications, 
Thousand Oaks, CA.
Poppo, L. and Zenger, T. (2002), “Do formal contracts and relational governance function as substitutes 
or complements?”, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 23 No. 8, pp. 707–725.
Poppo, L., Zhou, K.Z. and Ryu, S. (2008), “Alternative origins to interorganizational trust: An 
interdependence perspective on the shadow of the past and the shadow of the future”, 
Organization Science, Vol. 19 No. 1, pp. 39–55.
Puranam, P., Singh, H. and Zollo, M. (2006), “Organizing for innovation: Managing the coordination-
autonomy dilemma in technology acquisitions”, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 49 No. 2, 
pp. 263–280.
Quelin, B.V., Cabral, S., Lazzarini, S. and Kivleniece, I. (2019), “The private scope in public–private 
collaborations: An institutional and capability-based perspective”, Organization Science, Vol. 30 
No. 4, pp. 831–846.

































































Quelin, B.V., Kivleniece, I. and Lazzarini, S. (2017), “Public-private collaboration, hybridity and social 
value: Towards new theoretical perspectives”, Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 54 No. 6, pp. 
763–792.
RAE. (2012), Smart Infrastructure: The Future, The Royal Academy of Engineering, London (UK), available 
at: www.raeng.org.uk/smartinfrastructure.
Rangan, S., Samii, R. and Van Wassenhove, L.N. (2006), “Constructive partnerships: When alliances 
between private firms and public actors can enable creative strategies”, Academy of 
Management Review, Vol. 31 No. 3, pp. 738–751.
Roehrich, J.K. and Kivleniece, I. (2021), “Creating and distributing sustainable value through public-
private collaborative projects”, in George, G., Hass, M.R., Joshi, H., McGahan, A. and Tracey, P. 
(Eds.), Handbook on the Business of Sustainability: The Organization, Implementation, and 
Practice of Sustainable Growth, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, forthcoming.
Roehrich, J.K. and Lewis, M.A. (2014), “Procuring complex performance: Implications for exchange 
governance complexity”, International Journal of Operations & Production Management, Vol. 34 
No. 2, pp. 221–241.
Roehrich, J.K., Lewis, M.A. and George, G. (2014), “Are public–private partnerships a healthy option? A 
systematic literature review”, Social Science & Medicine, Vol. 113, pp. 110–119.
Roehrich, J.K., Selviaridis, K., Kalra, J., Van der Valk, W. and Fang, F. (2020), “Inter-organizational 
governance: A review, conceptualisation and extension”, Production Planning & Control, Vol. 31 
No. 6, pp. 453–469.
Roehrich, J.K., Tyler, B.B., Kalra, J. and Squire, B. (2021), “The decision process of contracting in supply 
chain management”, in Choi, T.Y., Li, J.J., Rogers, D.S., Rungtusanatham, J., Schoenherr, T. and 
Wagner, S.M. (Eds.), Handbook of “Supply Chain Management”, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Rosado Feger, A.L. (2014), “Creating cross-functional strategic consensus in manufacturing facilities”, 
International Journal of Operations & Production Management, Vol. 34 No. 7, pp. 941–970.
Schepker, D.J., Oh, W.-Y., Martynov, A. and Poppo, L. (2014), “The many futures of contracts: Moving 
beyond structure and safeguarding to coordination and adaption”, Journal of Management, Vol. 
40 No. 1, pp. 193–225.
Schilke, O. and Lumineau, F. (2018), “The double-edged effect of contracts on alliance performance”, 
Journal of Management, Vol. 44 No. 7, pp. 2827–2858.
Scurati, G.W., Gattullo, M., Fiorentino, M., Ferrise, F., Bordegoni, M. and Uva, A.E. (2018), “Converting 
maintenance actions into standard symbols for augmented reality applications in Industry 4.0”, 
Computers in Industry, Vol. 98, pp. 68–79.
Selviaridis, K. (2016), “Contract functions in service exchange governance: Evidence from logistics 
outsourcing”, Production Planning & Control, Vol. 27 No. 16, pp. 1373–1388.

































































Selviaridis, K. and Van der Valk, W. (2019), “Framing contractual performance incentives: Effects on 
supplier behaviour”, International Journal of Operations & Production Management, Vol. 39 No. 
2, pp. 190–213.
Shah, S.K. and Corley, K.G. (2006), “Building Better Theory by Bridging the Quantitative–Qualitative 
Divide*”, Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 43 No. 8, pp. 1821–1835.
Sivarajah, U., Kamal, M.M., Irani, Z. and Weerakkody, V. (2017), “Critical analysis of big data challenges 
and nalytical methods”, Journal of Business Research, Vol. 70, pp. 263–286.
Steinbach, T., Wallenburg, C.M. and Selviaridis, K. (2018), “Me, myself and I: Non-collaborative customer 
behavior in service outsourcing – the key role of outcome orientation and outcome 
attributability”, International Journal of Operations & Production Management, Vol. 38 No. 7, 
pp. 1519–1539.
Sternberg, H.S., Hofmann, E. and Roeck, D. (2020), “The struggle is real: Insights from a supply chain 
blockchain case”, Journal of Business Logistics, pp. 1–17.
Thompson, J.D. (1967), Organizations in Action: Social Science Bases of Administration Theory, McGraw 
Hill, New York, NY.
Tushman, M.L. and Nadler, D.A. (1978), “Information processing as an integrating concept in 
organization design”, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 3 No. 3, pp. 613–624.
Venkatraman, N. (1991), “IT-induced business reconfiguration”, in Morton, M.S.S. (Ed.), The Corporation 
of the 1990s: Information Technology and Organizational Transformation, Oxford University 
Press, New York, NY, pp. 122–158.
Waller, M.A. and Fawcett, S.E. (2013), “Data science, predictive analytics, and big data: A revolution that 
will transform supply chain design and management”, Journal of Business Logistics, Vol. 34 No. 
2, pp. 77–84.
Weber, L. and Mayer, K.J. (2011), “Designing effective contracts: Exploring the influence of framing and 
expectations”, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 36 No. 1, pp. 53–75.
Wiengarten, F., Ahmed, M.U., Longoni, A., Pagell, M. and Fynes, B. (2017), “Complexity and the triple 
bottom line: An information-processing perspective”, International Journal of Operations & 
Production Management, Vol. 37 No. 9, pp. 1142–1163.
Yin, R.K. (2009), Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 4th ed., SAGE Publications, Thousand Oaks, 
CA.
Yu, W., Chavez, R., Jacobs, M., Wong, C.Y. and Yuan, C. (2019), “Environmental scanning, supply chain 
integration, responsiveness, and operational performance: An integrative framework from an 
organizational information processing theory perspective”, International Journal of Operations & 
Production Management, Vol. 39 No. 5, pp. 787–814.
Zhao, Y., Feng, T. and Shi, H. (2018), “External involvement and green product innovation: The 
moderating role of environmental uncertainty”, Business Strategy Environment, Vol. 27 No. 8, 
pp. 1167–1180.

































































Zheng, J., Roehrich, J.K. and Lewis, M.A. (2008), “The dynamics of contractual and relational governance: 
Evidence from long-term public–private procurement arrangements”, Journal of Purchasing and 
Supply Management, Vol. 14 No. 1, pp. 43–54.

































































Figure 1 Research model of information processing activities and governance mechanisms managing 
information asymmetries 
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Table 1 Case (organisation) characteristics
Public organisation – Road (the Netherlands)
Responsible for main road & waterways and water management in 
the Netherlands
Public organisation – Rail (the Netherlands)
Responsible for main railways in the Netherlands




Consortium of: (1) a large 
supplier (20,000 employees) 
specialised in construction; and 
(2) a medium-sized supplier (175 
employees) specialised in 
hydraulic engineering.
Consortium of: (1) a large 
supplier (46,500 employees) 
specialised in electro-technical 
installations; and (2) a medium-
sized supplier (180 employees) 
specialised in construction.
Medium-sized supplier (275 
employees) specialised in 
construction and maintenance of 
railroad systems.
Large supplier (6,500 employees) 
specialised in construction and 
maintenance of railroad systems.
Public and private 
organisation’s 
objectives 
Road (public): Safeguard public interests (e.g. availability, security) 
and maintain aging infrastructure with limited budgets in a 
sustainable manner, while also dealing with extended responsibility 
(Road is publicly accountable in case failures occur, even if supplier’s 
actions caused it).
Suppliers (private): Increase volume (e.g. remain focused on 
preventive rather than predictive maintenance, so that more 
maintenance activities can be performed) of maintenance activities, 
thereby potentially decreasing the availability of infrastructures.
Rail (public): Safeguard public interests (e.g. availability, security), 
maintain aging infrastructure with limited budgets, and perform 
effective traffic management on the railroad network. Rail also needs to 
deal with extended responsibility (Rail is publicly accountable in case 
failures occur, even if supplier’s actions caused it).
Suppliers (private): Increase volume (e.g. remain focused on preventive 
rather than predictive maintenance, so that more maintenance 
activities can be performed) of maintenance activities, thereby 
potentially hindering effective traffic control.
Information needs 
by both public and 
private 
organisation
Road (public): Is reliant on up-to-date information about the health of 
assets and performed maintenance from their suppliers to more 
efficiently manage assets and monitor availability/safety of the 
network due to their extended responsibility. Requires technical 
knowledge of the suppliers regarding assets to transform data.
Suppliers (private): Requires historical data from Road’s systems to 
calibrate degradation models for assets in order to detect failures and 
better plan future maintenance activities.
Rail (public): Requires up-to-date information about the health of assets 
and maintenance activities to re-route or re-schedule trains in case of 
failures, check suppliers’ performance, and monitor availability/safety 
of the network due to their extended responsibility.
Suppliers (private): Requires the newest data from inspection trains to 
complement their own inspection data to monitor the condition of 
assets. Builds on historical data from Rail’s systems to better plan future 
maintenance activities.
Prior relationship No prior relationship with either supplier of the current suppliers. No prior relationship with current 
supplier.
Second consecutive contract. 
Previous contract period: 5 years.
Contract:
   - Scope
Maintenance of an important 
waterway corridor (15,000 ships 
per year) connecting the eastern 
part of the Netherlands with 
Germany.
Maintenance of an important 
waterway corridor connecting 
inland waterways to the North 
Sea. Water pumping station 
keeps 1/3 of the Netherlands dry.
Maintenance of a major railway 
connection (10 passenger trains 
per hour) between two large cities 
in the middle and southern part of 
the Netherlands. 
Maintenance of the railway 
connections around the most 
central train station in the 
Netherlands (100 passenger 
trains per hour).





























































International Journal of Operations and Production Management
   - Type Locally customised performance-
based contract.
Locally customised contract with 
performance & behavioural aspects.
Centrally led performance-based contract.
5 years (option for two 1-year extensions). 5 years (with extension option if new public tender is delayed).   - Duration & start 
of contract period 2014 2016 2017 2019
Digital strategy
(case organisations)
Recently initiated an organisation-wide programme, focused on 
implementing smart maintenance supported by digital technologies.
An established, central department that acts as a Data Lab that analyses 
data coming from digital technologies.
Technologies Sensors mounted to critical (moving) parts of sluice doors and to 
motor units in the water pumps. Started implementation: 2018.
Sensors mounted to railroad switches (started in 2017) and fourteen 
passenger trains belonging to one of Rail’s customers (started in 2018).
Data sources  Sensors & suppliers’ inspection reports
 Road’s operating systems for moving assets (such as sluices)
 Road and suppliers’  asset management systems
 Dedicated inspection trains equipped with cameras and sensors
 Sensors & suppliers’ inspection reports
 Rail’s asset management system
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Table 1 Main data sources and use of data
Data source Research stage Type of data Use in the analysis
Archival data 
and contracts
Exploratory 6 public documents in total (64 pages), including: 
 1 sector wide report on data usage in public entities;
“Best practices: Innovative examples of data usage by the 
Government”
 2 sector wide vision documents and 1 presentation on 
collaborating with private suppliers;
“The market vision”
“Leading principles for a better collaboration between client 
and supplier in 2020”
“Chain cooperation and social innovation management and 
maintenance of linear infrastructure”
 2 news items regarding the maintenance of railways.
“Investing in a better collaboration benefits rail maintenance”
“Supplier wins maintenance contract Rail B”
Understanding the sector both case organisations operate 
in and current best practices with respect to data use 
within the sector.
Familiarising ourselves with the general view within the 
sector on how public-private relationships should be 
established and maintained.
In-depth 31 contract documents in total (973 pages), including:
 8 contract documents (one document describing the tender 
process [60 pages], one document with the core [26 pages], 
three documents with specifications [183 pages] and three 
annexes [211 pages]).
 9 documents describing optional and area specific activities 
that suppliers can perform to earn additional profits during 
contract period (153 pages).
 14 documents prescribing area specific activities that the 
supplier is expected to perform as part of the core 
agreements (340 pages).
Identifying current contractual agreements between Road 
and their private maintenance suppliers, including 
performance objectives that the supplier needs to 
achieve, provisions regarding data sharing and 
transformation, and incentive schemes.
Triangulation with findings and insights from the 
exploratory research stage and the semi-structured 
interviews.
19 Internal documents in total (493 pages), including:
 6 reports and 2 presentations on Road’s innovation program 
for maintenance:
“Project plan: Vital Assets – Pilot Road A”
“Project plan: Vital Assets – Pilot Road B”
“Vision on Vital Assets”
“Expected approach in case of failures and Vital Assets”
“Proposal investment program ‘maintaining and improving 
the reliability of aging installations’”
Collecting data on data gathering and transformation 
activities and on the desired relationship with suppliers.
Triangulation with findings and insights from the exploratory 
research stage, and the semi-structured interviews.
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“LEF future centre: Vital Assets”
“Pilot Road A: The old sluice – predictive corrosion 
maintenance”
“Vital Assets in practice: pilot Road A and other pilots”
 5 reports on collaboration with private suppliers:
“Get rid of the traditional division of roles in management 
and maintenance!”
“Towards a vital infra sector: Project plan for a joint transition 
process”
“Vision on Vital Assets in relation to procurement”
“Handbook of the tender team”
“Working on change management for IA sourcing: At the 
intersection of cooperation, market approach and 
technology”
 2 presentations (one by Road’s Chief Data Officer and one by 
a Solution Architect) intended for Road employees on how 
Road gathers & uses asset data:
“Data, the connecting link: Data for a customer-oriented, 
reliable, transparent and innovative Road organisation”
“How do you get data? With the Object Data Service!”
 1 corporate presentation on Rail’s activities intended for 
external parties:
“Rail: General information”. 






Exploratory 10 observations in total, including: 3 tours around Road’s facilities 
(showcasing critical assets equipped with sensors), 2 meetings 
between Road and their suppliers (discussing the progress of 
fitting sensors and sharing insights from sensor data), and 4 
knowledge sharing sessions at Road and 1 at Rail (discussions 
between internal employees and external experts on the use of 
digital technologies for maintenance).
Obtaining an initial understanding of the various types of 
assets that are being maintained by Road, and of the roles 
of both Road and their suppliers in the maintenance 
process.
Experiencing how Road collaborates with their private 
maintenance suppliers.
Further developing our understanding of the various 
innovations being developed at both Road and Rail.

































































Exploratory 8 pilot interviews in total, 6 at Road (internal advisors in the area 
of innovation or contracting) and 2 at Rail (internal advisors in 
the area of innovation).
Obtaining an initial understanding of the key responsibilities 
and activities of Road and Rail and current innovations 
with respect to the maintenance and management of 
infrastructure assets.
Identifying potential cases at Road and Rail.
Familiarising ourselves with Road and Rail’s current views on 
how data should be used, the desired relationships with 





In-depth 20 semi-structured interviews in total, including:
 5 at Road A (Asset Manager 1, Asset Manager 2, Contract 
Manager 1, Advisor 1, and Data Scientist 1)
 5 at Road B (Asset Specialist 1, Asset Manager 3, Contract 
Manager 2, Regional Director 1, and Configuration Manager 
1).
 4 at Rail (Project Manager 1, Data Scientist 2, Contract 
Manager 3, and Area Manager 1).
 3 at Rail A (Area Manager 2, Regional Contract Manager 1, 
and Assistant Area Manager 1).
 3 at Rail B (Area Manager 3, Regional Contract Manager 2, 
and Assistant Area Manager 2).
Obtaining data and detailed insights into the following three 
aspects:
1. maintenance activities and how these are affected 
by data (e.g. Asset Managers, Asset Specialist, and 
Assistant Area Managers).
2. contractual agreements and relationships with 
suppliers (e.g. [Regional] Contract Managers and 
Regional Director).
3. data gathering, sharing and transformation activities 
(e.g. Data Scientists and Configuration Manager).
Triangulation with findings and insights from exploratory 
research stage.
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Table 3a Findings and key quotes from Road A
Road A
Uncertainty  In order to access needed data, Road A aimed to play a central role in data gathering:
[1] “Road ultimately owns the objects. I think it is good if Road obtains and manages data itself” – Data Scientist 1.
[2] “We are also looking for a link with our asset management system, in which the supplier mainly works” – Asset Manager 2.
 Road A experienced difficulties with respect to determining the exact data they needed from their suppliers:
[3] “That [the availability of data] differs per object. Usually, no explicit agreements were made about this in the past” – Data Scientist 1.
Equivocality  Although Rail A possessed relevant data, their employees did not know their information needs and thus how the data should be transferred:
[4] “The biggest challenge lies in determining the information needs. What is the relevant information that we need for the various processes 
we have?” – Asset Manager 1.
[5] “It would help if we had someone who acts as a customer, who explains how we can help him and what exactly he needs” – Data Scientist 1.
 To make sense of data, Road A relied on their supplier’s input:
[6] “My dashboard indicates action is required within three months. ‘Do you have the same experience? Does this pump show you anything 
that something is wrong?’ You will always need each other with respect to this” – Asset Manager 2.
Contractual Governance Relational Governance
Information 
Acquisition
 Contracts stipulated that Road owns the data and that suppliers 
must share relevant data (i.e. control):
[7] “We have 1 main objective. We call it ‘making the ABC’ of our 
contract area. Improve the quality of documents and data” – Asset 
Manager 2.
[8] “The supplier must deliver area data once maintenance is 
completed, so that Road can perform proper management of its 
area” – Contract (Annex 3, page 45.)
 Contract prohibited (future) data sharing with other parties 
(control):
[9] “But we want to be able to pass that data on to the next 
supplier” – Asset Manager 1.  
 Supplier takes advantage of vague agreements:
[10] “The supplier tries to limit its efforts as much as possible. It 
simply thinks: ‘I do not really have to do that, because the contract 
does not exactly detail what I have to do’” – Asset Manager 1.
 Road A’s many requests for data led the supplier to think that Road 
A wanted to govern the maintenance activities the supplier was 
responsible for:
[11] “There is friction between the supplier and Road. Suppliers find 
it strange that we want to know a lot and the say: you have us to 
manage that, why do you want to govern that?” – Advisor 1.
 Trust was needed to ensure a supplier is not reluctant to share 
data:
[12] “I think that it is mainly a matter of creating good connections 
and agreeing on what you are going to do” – Data Scientist 1.
[13] “Interpersonal aspects and acceptance of each other’s qualities 
play an important role. We must trust and strengthen each other” – 
‘The Market Vision’ document (page 7)
Information 
Transformation
 Basic transformation activities were requested from suppliers 
through the contract:
 Collaboration and common goals ensured most information was 
actually unlocked and interpreted in the same way:
[16] “What I would also like to see is that market parties realise 
that by jointly working on this type of information, they can also 
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[14] “The supplier must provide a progress report. This is used to 
determine what the performance of the supplier has been” – 
Contract Manager 1.
 Redesign of contract required to better support knowledge sharing: 
[15] “In our contracts, we want to organise a different way of 
rewarding [suppliers] in order to prevent unnecessary costs 
(including the use of capacity) and to support the sharing of 
knowledge and data” – ‘Towards a vital sector’ document (page 40)
organise maintenance process much more efficiently” – Asset 
Manager 1.
[17] “I want to discuss this with the supplier, so not simply supply 
the data and then have to rely entirely on the analysis that is being 
made. […] I would like to do at least some of those processes 
together, to avoid discussion about the used data” – Asset Manager 
1.
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Table 3b Findings and key quotes from Road B
Road B
Uncertainty  Road B did not receive all required information due to wrong configurations in the connection between their own system and their supplier’s 
system and because of misunderstandings about what data were actually needed:
[18] “Not enough data are being sent and we still miss a lot of things. We are working very hard on fixing this” – Configuration Manager 1.
[19] “At the beginning the filled out too little information. […]. The data should provide us with enough information, and not just things like 
‘finished’ and ‘button pressed’” – Contract Manager 2.
Equivocality  The data in Road B’s database did not have the correct data format and the extended time it takes to fix the data format rendered the data 
useless:
[20] “The information is described in the description, but that is not in the form of data. If you want to analyse that, you have to search in the 
text boxes and order that first” – Asset Manager 3.
[21] “It is not real-time information due to the large time difference. It is not reliable and it is not correct anymore” – Asset Manager 3.
 Road B’s system could not handle all types of file formats they received:
[22] “We are twenty years behind with this within Road. We ‘flatten’ everything to 2D [while supplier sends 3D]. […] We do not have the 
facilities for that to embrace 3D. You understand of course that we lose a lot of data” – Asset Manager 3.
Contractual Governance Relational Governance
Information 
Acquisition
 Contracts stipulated that Road owned the data. Suppliers had to 
share to avoid penalties (i.e. control); penalties were found to be 
ineffective:
[23] “If the supplier does not want to transfer it, the supplier does 
not meet the contract requirements. Then you get a penalty or even 
a breach of contract” – Configuration Manager 1.
[24] “They do get a penalty, but that is sometimes much less than 
what they can save if they do nothing” – Asset Specialist 3.
 Contract also included the requirement to connect data systems 
(control):
[25] “We have had it [requirement to connect systems] included in 
the performance contract, which will have it [data from supplier] 
transferred automatically.” – Configuration Manager 1.
 Agreements about what to share were vague and inconsistent 
(coordination):
[26] “What they have to fill is in the agreement. But these 
agreements are based on a very old system” – Configuration 
Manager 1.
 Suppliers seemed hesitant to share all maintenance data:
[27] “But they do not put all their cards on the table. It is true.” – 
Configuration Manager 1. 
 Road invested in open communication and tried to refrain from 
penalising suppliers immediately to avoid a blaming game:
[28] “We are open and transparent regarding the needed and 
available information” – ‘The Market Vision’ document (page 6)
[29] “What does the supplier need and what do we need? That is 
how we collaborate. It is no longer about point fingers to each 
other” – Configuration Manager 1.
[30] “Our goal now is to work more with the market. Previously, we 
had a more steering role” – Contract Manager 2.
 Road sought to enhance current relationships through two-way 
sharing:
[31] “We are not only knowledge seekers, but also knowledge 
bearers. So we can also return knowledge to them” – Configuration 
Manager 1.
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Information 
Transformation
 Misaligned contract agreements hampered transformation:
 [32] “The biggest problem is that internal information needs and 
contract requirements are not working together. If you have 
specified your internal information needs, the contract should 
actually be accommodating to it” – Configuration Manager 1.
 Contract stipulated that recurring meetings should have been 
organised to jointly interpret and transform information:
[33] “The Principal organises one or more meetings per period to 
discuss the evaluation reports” – Contract (Specification 1, page 
38).
 Road sought collaboration to receive all information:
[34] “That is our pilot. That they process all malfunctions directly in 
our system” – Asset Manager 3.
[35] “We look at the asset in the field. Is it properly maintained, and 
does it [information in the system] match the current state of the 
asset? And that you then assess together” – Contract Manager 2.
 Closer collaboration was also needed to induce flexibility and 
motivate parties to look beyond contract agreements:
[36] “Not only our contracts have to change, also our behaviours 
and attitudes. It is not the same as five or more years ago. […] You 
have to flexible, you cannot afford to be rigid anymore” – Contract 
Manager 2.
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Table 4a Findings and key quotes from Rail A
Rail A
Uncertainty  Rail A and their supplier jointly populated Rail’s A asset management system with data: 
[37] “That is a system where we just share the data. They [the supplier] see everything in it, but I see that too” – Assistant Area Manager 1.
 The supplier also collected data about their own activities and shared data with Rail A upon request:
[38] “We want those suppliers to track and record this [data performance maintenance activities], and when we say ‘now I want to see it’ you 
have to deliver it” – Area Manager 2.
 There were some concerns that the supplier did not share all data they had and that the quality of data was not always of appropriate quality:
[39] “We have experienced this every once in a while, that certain information is not provided, is not correct, is not complete, or does not meet 
the requirements” – Area Manager 2.
Equivocality  A large part of the data in Rail A’s database did not correspond to the actual situation at Rail A’s assets and, hence, should have been cleaned:
[40] “In the past, this [data cleaning] has not yet been done correctly at Rail. There are a kind of improvement steps going on now. However, 
you are not completely up-to-date in your database with respect to what is actually outside at the moment” – Assistant Area Manager 1.
 Even though they had the data, Rail A did not know what they wanted to do with the data:
[41] “The question is: what will you do with it? Because yes, data are provided, but if you do not do anything else, you still do not have a KPI for 
your senior management and for your team” – Regional Contract Manager 1.
Contractual Governance Relational Governance
Information 
Acquisition
 Rail specified clauses with respect to data usage (i.e. control):
[42] “There is a certain clause in the PBC contract that clearly states 
that this and this must be reported by [supplier] to [Rail], and then 
[Rail] must act on it” – Assistant Area Manager 1.
[43] “It is stated there that every renovation that takes place or 
anything maintenance-related that is of importance for this 
equipment, that they must share it with us. The contract just states 
that they [maintenance suppliers] are the ones who are responsible” 
– Assistant Area Manager 1.
 Contract enforcement (i.e. control) is crucial, but had been 
deteriorating over time:
[44] “Enforcement needs to be tightened, as the department that 
used to enforce has been cut by 50%” – Assistant Area Manager 1.
[45] “Then the supplier’s ‘beeping system’ comes around. I do not 
deliver and I’ll see if I hear something” – Regional Contract Manager 1
[46] “Suppliers does not do as we have contracted. Sometimes the 
supplier ‘forgets’ to deliver [data] and keep quiet about it until we ask 
for it” – Regional Contract Manager 1.
 Afraid of the consequences (e.g. penalties in case data showed 
that the supplier did not achieve all contract requirements), Rail 
A’s supplier aimed to share the minimal accepted amount of data:
[47] “Data about maintenance activities is something the supplier 
makes a fuss about, so you have to ask for it all the time. They 
prefer to keep this a bit foggy” – Assistant Area Manager 1.
[48] “Certain things that might put the organisation in a bad, or in 
a less good, daylight… the supplier try to cover this a bit” – 
Assistant Area Manager 1.
 Transparency may lead to non-compliance with tender 
regulations and thus Rail and their supplier refrained from sharing 
all data:
[49] “Transparency is not desirable. Maybe not from [Rail] either, 
but I am not sure about this” – Regional Contract Manager 1.
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Information 
Transformation
 Rail A required transformed information from suppliers and strictly 
controlled everything they received:
[50] “They have to demonstrate on a monthly basis, by means of 
data, that the requirements we set in the contract, that they meet 
them” – Area Manager 2.
[51] “You also have to have strict control over everything that you 
receive. We are now trying to get more employees available to do the 
checks, because that is simply very important. [We need] to ensure 
that the IT guys have sufficient capacity to continue to do this well” – 
Assistant Area Manager 1.
 Rail A distrusted any information shared by the supplier’s higher-
level managers:
[52] “The management of such a supplier are sent to bring a 
certain message. They try to make things more beautiful than that 
they are” – Assistant Area Manager 1.
 Open communication with the supplier’s operational level 
employees was established that led to additional information 
transformation:
[53] “You have the technical men that try to perform their work in 
a way that works best for the railroad tracks. So sometimes they 
say something that they perhaps should not have said” – Assistant 
Area Manager 1.
 Rail A refrained from establishing a common goal with the 
supplier to avoid non-compliance with tender regulations.
[54] “I fully understand what is behind it, the compliancy issue. It 
just makes it very difficult for us to achieve a common goal with 
our supplier in a way that we would like’ – Assistant Area 
Manager 1.
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Table 4b Findings and key quotes from Rail B
Rail B
Uncertainty  Data about failures were directly entered into Rail B’s asset management, both by their own employees as well as the supplier’s employees:
[55] “They do that, we use [software package]. It actually contains everything about such a failure. What happened, what they did about it” – 
Area Manager 3.
Equivocality  Rail B’s employees tried to make sense of the data themselves but could not extract all information from the available data:
[56] “I like the fact that we can now predict with data in advance which switches function and which switches do not, so that we can make 
adjustments” – Assistant Area Manager 2.
[57] “I rely on data from the inspection train. It [results from inspection train data] is all good and we are doing pretty well in terms of failures. 
But I also do not have everything in sight and neither do the inspectors” – Regional Contract Manager 2.
 To assist transformation activities, Rail B’s area manager reached out to the supplier at times:
[58] “We have a lot of contact with each other, we look for solutions together, and I try to inform them in time when I see problems coming up” 
– Area Manager 3.
Contractual Governance Relational Governance
Information 
Acquisition
 Rail B’s contract stipulated that the supplier must share data upon 
request (i.e. control):
[59] “If one of our inspectors has been outside and comes back with 
the message ‘that doesn’t look good’, we [Rail] can request all their 
inspection reports” – Assistant Area Manager 2. 
 Rail B’s contract also described the role and responsibilities of the 
supplier (i.e. coordination): 
[60] “We prescribe what the standard is. The qualitative standard it 
[assets and related data] must meet and then they [supplier] are 
free to try to achieve this” – Assistant Area Manager 2.
 Rail became increasingly stricter with enforcement of their 
contracts (control):
[61] “You can clearly see that Rail has also more strictly enforced 
these maintenance contracts in recent years” – Regional Contract 
Manager 2.
 Suppliers seemed hesitant to be completely transparent to Rail:
[62] “But they [supplier] also see things outside that we [Rail] have 
not seen that they are not going to report. That is just how it works” 
– Regional Contract Manager 2.
 Rail B did not blindly enforce the contract and their penalties all the 
time, but aimed to keep the supplier’s point of view in mind and 
informed them about the need of contractual agreements:
[63] “I especially think deviations should not be used for all that is 
not good, because if you impose a deviation for everything that is 
incorrect, a supplier will be paid nothing” – Regional Contract 
Manager 2.
[64] “We do not push the contract to the background. Of course it is 
important that you have a good relationship, but it is also 




 Rail B required their supplier to transform data from their 
inspection rounds into information about assets’ condition and how 
assets could best be maintained: 
[65] “Inspection reports, maintenance plans… we can request this 
on demand.” – Assistant Area Manager 2.
 Rail B aimed to invest in relation norms to foster open sharing of 
information and that motivated both parties ‘to go the extra mile’, 
allowing flexible contract application:
[67] “In other contract areas that have the same supplier, the teams 
are much stricter, but the collaboration is not going that well over 
there and there is a lot of hassle” – Regional Contract Manager 2.
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 Rail B checked all the information that was supplied by their 
supplier: 
[66] “It is about procedural matters, but also just whether the 
information is good” – Regional Contract Manager 2.
[68] “In any case, I like the fact that we have a good relationship 
with our [maintenance] supplier, which means that we get a lot of 
things done that do not happen in other regions. I think you will be 
better off with that in the end” – Regional Contract Manager 2.


































































The interview protocol below lists the generic and function-specific questions that guided the semi-
structured interviews.
General Questions (all interviewees)
 Can you describe the total worth (economically, socially, etc.) of the assets for which your 
organisation is responsible?
 To what extent are data and information already utilised when performing management and 
maintenance activities?
Management & Maintenance Activities (Asset Managers, Asset Specialists and Assistant Area 
Managers). 
 Can you describe how the management and maintenance activities of the infrastructure assets 
are currently organised?
 To what extent is your organisation ready for smarter maintenance methods?
 Are there any steps left to be taken by your organisation to achieve smart management and 
maintenance of assets? If so, can you describe these steps?
 Can you describe which role suppliers should play in realising smarter maintenance methods?
Information Processing & Innovation (Advisors, Data Scientists, Configuration Manager, Project 
Manager, and Area Managers)
 What data does your organisation (plan to) share with supplier(s) and what data does your 
organisation (plan to) request from supplier(s)?
 To what extent does your organisation request supplier(s) to contribute to the implementation 
of digital technologies for the purpose of maintenance?
 In your opinion, what role will data and information play regarding smarter maintenance?
 Which party do you think should take a leading role in achieving smarter maintenance?
Outsourcing of Maintenance (Advisor, Regional Director, Contract Managers and Regional Contract 
Managers)
 Can you describe the ‘composition’ of the maintenance contract?
 Can you describe the outsourcing process for maintenance activities?
 Can you describe the last maintenance contract awarded by your department?
 Can you describe the collaboration with the current supplier?
 Can you describe what a future cooperation should look like?
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Appendix B
The table below summarises the different tactics and their operationalisation within our study to enhance reliability and validity. 
Table B1 Summary of research credibility (adapted from Gibbert et al., 2008; Yin, 2009)
Test Tactic Research Stage Operationalisation
Construct 
Validity
Using multiple sources of 
evidence to enable 
triangulation of data
Exploratory stage & In-
depth case research stage
 Evidence is collected from multiple groups of informants at buyer side 
(e.g. data specialists, maintenance experts and contract managers) 
regarding both the buyer side as well as supplier side.
 Gained access to contract documents governing the relationships under 
investigation.
 Additional documentary evidence (e.g. firm documents and 
government reports) and observational notes were collected to support 
data triangulation.
Establishing a clear chain 
of evidence
In-depth case research 
stage
 Detailed case study descriptions written, based on all sources of 
evidence, to uncover information processing activities and governance 
mechanisms used in investigated relationships.
 Original material (e.g. interview transcripts and documentary evidence) 
is referenced throughout the paper.
Letting key informants 
review draft reports
In-depth case research 
stage
 Case study descriptions were discussed during extensive meetings that 
included both the two lead authors as well as a small selection of key 
informants from both case organisations to verify our analyses.





Using replication logic in 
multiple case studies 
(pattern matching)
In-depth case research 
stage
 Analysis of case studies was guided by several main concepts that were 
derived from existing literature (IPT and governance mechanisms).
 Built on 'analytical generalisation’ by seeking to identify patterns across 
the four case.
 Case studies aimed to generalise to some wider theory (i.e. IPT), rather 
than a population.
Reliability Interview protocol Exploratory stage & In-
depth case research stage
 Interview protocols were established based on concepts from existing 
literature and they contained the procedures and questions for data 
collection during both research stages.
Case study database Exploratory stage & In-
depth case research stage
 We created a case study database in Atlas.ti and Windows File Explorer 
while collecting data including, for instance interview transcripts, 
observational notes and contract documents.


































































The figure below presents the final coding structure that was constructed for the data analysis.

































































Figure C1. Final coding scheme
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